

INVESTIGATION REPORT

CASE NO.

10-003

DATE

5/24/2010

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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

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OR

THE IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

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CASE OVERVIEW/ALLEGATIONS

On February 23, 2010, the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) received information from [REDACTED] regarding allegations that certain information technology (IT) contractors were working on projects for clients other than the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) while on IDOC time using IDOC equipment. It was further alleged that the contractor, CRI Advantage, Inc. (CRI), and their subcontractor, AnalyzeSoft, Inc. (ASI), engaged in fraudulent billing practices related to this work.

This investigation sought to answer two specific questions: the extent and scope of the contractors' activities and the circumstances surrounding the creation of an environment that fostered their activities. Particular attention was paid to the time period from 1/1/2009 to 2/16/2010 as most of the contractors in question began working at IDOC in January of 2009 and most of the evidence collected occurred during that time.

Twenty-two current and former employees were interviewed during the course of the investigation. Most of the witnesses believed that ASI contractors were actively working on non-IDOC projects while on IDOC premises, and several of the witnesses reported this activity to management, one as early as 3/3/2009. There is a wealth of forensic evidence to support the assertion that ASI contractors were engaging in unauthorized activities as early as 5/9/2007, and it appears there was a long-term pattern of the contractors using IDOC equipment without restriction. There is evidence to suggest that some of the contractors worked almost exclusively on the Alaska Corrections Offender Management System (ACOMS) with little or no work performed for IDOC, while they continued to bill IDOC for their time.

On January 6, 2010, a meeting took place between IDOC IT management staff and ASI principals, Arup Patranabish and Platt Thompson in which it was requested that ASI cease all unauthorized activities including removing IDOC equipment from the building without specific permission. ASI agreed to address the contractors' behavior and correct some of the issues raised in this meeting to ensure that "double-billing" was not occurring. However, evidence gathered from e-mails, screen shots and the contractors' hard drives indicates that the contractors' activities actually accelerated after the 1/6/2010 meeting and continued steadily until they were removed from the building on 2/16/2010. This activity corresponds with the deadlines associated with the Alaska projects.

CRI Chief Operating Officer Ken Malach was interviewed and disavowed all knowledge of ASI's activities. [REDACTED] confirmed that CRI received twenty percent of the value of the invoices submitted to IDOC for ASI's work, but took no active role in the management of the contract. CRI invoiced IDOC for approximately \$1.3 million during the calendar year 2009 through 1/15/2010.

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ASI principals Arup Patranabish, Platt Thompson and David McCauley were interviewed and all three acknowledged negligence in monitoring their contractors, but denied specific knowledge of their activities. The evidence does not support this assertion because there are multiple examples of ASI principals and other ASI staff directing the day-to-day activities of the contractors and their work on ACOMS.

There were a number of ASI contractors working in the building after Patranabish's departure from the building in March of 2009. It appears from the evidence that there were few controls placed on the contractors' activities, either by ASI or IDOC. Witnesses stated that there was little or no documentation to support the programming performed by the contractors or verification of their work product. It does not appear that there was any accountability for missed deadlines or poor work performance associated with the contractors. The contractors consistently utilized the IDOC computer equipment inappropriately by removing it from the building, performing non-authorized work, installing non-authorized programs and conducting excessive personal business not related to their contractual duties. They also appeared to be utilizing IDOC provided specialized programming software and network server time to further their work on the ACOMS project. Evidence reviewed in the screen shots appears to indicate that the IDOC security systems were breached multiple times to allow the contractors to work directly on the ACOMS system.

IDOC staff reported their concerns about the contractors' activities to several levels of management over the past year, but it does not appear that these reports were taken seriously until sometime in December 2009. The evidence in this case suggests that management implicitly trusted the contractors, and did not maintain adequate controls regarding them.

BACKGROUND – CORRECTIONAL INTEGRATED SYSTEM (CIS)

In March of 2003, IDOC received an initial portion of "O-Track" from the Utah DOC, this was commonly known as the "Utah System." In March of 2005, IDOC contracted with IBM to provide programming services to convert the system from an older programming language to JAVA at a cost of \$192,028 with a final invoice date in April 2006.

It appears that there were problems with this conversion and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] hired Arup Patranabish as a professional services contractor some time in June of 2006. Between July 2006 and February 2007, Patranabish received approximately \$82,000 for programming services. When [REDACTED] realized that [REDACTED] was outside the state contracting policy when [REDACTED] paid Patranabish more than \$50,000, [REDACTED] contacted CRI (a state approved vendor) and requested that they hire Patranabish so that IDOC could contract with them, which they did. One additional contractor was hired in March of 2007, Chowdhry Saravanaperumal. These two positions were identified as dedicated to CIS and other internal IDOC projects and were funded through IDOC general funds.

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In September of 2006, IDOC received notification from the US Department of Justice that a grant application for \$1,000,000 had been approved out of the Federal PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) funds. \$400,000 of these grant funds were earmarked for use in CIS enhancements to address data collection issues associated with PREA. In April 2007, IDOC and CRI signed a Statement of Work for CRI to provide contractors to program the requested enhancements. [REDACTED] questioned the quality and expense of the work performed by the contractors. Ultimately, CRI was paid \$298,000 for this PREA related work. In the current OPS case, several IT staff have asserted that this programming was never activated in CIS and they were unable to locate the code and information for the work performed.

In October 2007, OPS investigation #07-032 was conducted regarding the appropriateness of the contractual arrangements between IDOC, ASI and CRI. Findings in this case were that the arrangements were “technically legal, though ethically questionable.” Recommendations included improvement in tracking and recording of private contractors’ time and billing and better administrative oversight.

BACKGROUND – NCOMS

National Consortium of Offender Management Systems (NCOMS) is also known as the “consortium,” “CIS 2.0” and “modularization.” NCOMS was formed in January of 2004. Idaho hosted the first formal NCOMS meeting in October 2004 and [REDACTED] was identified as the first board chair.

In November of 2005 IDOC filed a COPS Technology grant on behalf of NCOMS to pay for travel and attendance at working sessions and meetings for the purpose of developing technical standards for the NCOMS programming. This \$24,681 grant was awarded in August of 2006.

An additional COPS Technology grant was filed by IDOC on behalf of NCOMS in June of 2008. This \$46,765 grant was awarded in September of 2008 and paid for two (2) Servers, software and software licenses.

A Byrne grant application was filed by IDOC on behalf of NCOMS’ programming needs in June of 2008. This \$1.2 million dollar grant was awarded in September 2008 and was to supply the programming time and equipment necessary to create a “modularized” version of CIS for use by NCOMS members.

****Note:** A glossary is included at the end of this report. ******

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5/24/2010**APPLICABLE POLICY, RULES AND STATUTES****IDAHO STATE STATUTE TITLE 18, CHAPTER 17 – CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY**

18-1701. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY DEFINED. If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1) or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each combined to commit.

IDAHO STATE STATUTE TITLE 18, CHAPTER 24 - THEFT

18-2403. THEFT. (1) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof. (2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property, with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in any of the following ways: by deception; by conduct heretofore defined or known as larceny, common law larceny by trick, obtaining property, money or labor under false pretenses; and/or by false promise. (Reproduced in part – see complete statute for further information.)

IDAHO STATE STATUTE TITLE 18, CHAPTER 57 – PUBLIC FUNDS AND SECURITIES

18-5701. MISUSE OF PUBLIC MONEYS BY PUBLIC OFFICERS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. No public employee shall: (10) Knowingly use any public moneys, or financial transaction card, financial transaction card account number or credit account issued to or for the benefit of any governmental entity to make any purchase, loan, guarantee or advance of moneys for any personal purpose or for any purpose other than for the use or benefit of the governmental entity.

IDAHO STATE STATUTE TITLE 67, CHAPTER 23 – MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

67-2332. INTERAGENCY CONTRACTS. Any one or more public agencies may contract with any one or more other public agencies to perform any governmental service, activity, or undertaking which each public agency entering into the contract is authorized by law to perform, including, but not limited to joint contracting for services, supplies and capital equipment, provided that such contract shall be authorized by the governing body of each party to the contract. Such contract shall set forth fully the purposes, powers, rights, objectives and responsibilities of the contracting parties.

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IDAPA 15.04.01 – Rules of Division of Human Resources and Personnel Commission
IDAPA 15.04.01.190.01(b) Inefficiency, incompetency, or negligence in performing duties, or job performance that fails to meet established performance standards; and/or (e) Insubordination or conduct unbecoming a state employee or conduct detrimental to good order and discipline in the department; and/or (g) Careless, negligent, or improper use or unlawful conversion of state property, equipment or funds.

STATE OF IDAHO STANDARD CONTRACT TERMS AND CONDITIONS Standard TC (Revised 10/1/09)

- 14. *Contractor Responsibility: The Contractor is responsible for furnishing and delivery of all Property included in this Agreement, whether or not the Contractor is the manufacturer or producer of such Property. Further, the Contractor will be the sole point of contact on contractual matters, including payment of charges resulting from the use or purchase of Property.*
- 15. *Subcontracting: Unless otherwise allowed by the State in this Agreement, the Contractor shall not, without written approval from the State, enter into any subcontract relating to the performance of this Agreement or any part thereof. Approval by the State of Contractor’s request to subcontract or acceptance of or payment for subcontracted work by the State shall not in any way relieve the Contractor of any responsibility under this Agreement. The Contractor shall be and remain liable for all damages to the State caused by negligent performance or non-performance of work under the Agreement by Contractor’s subcontractor or its sub-subcontractor.*

SUBJECT(S):





- 1. CRI Advantage, Inc., 12754 West LaSalle, Boise, Idaho 83713. Telephone: (208) 343-9192. Chief Operating Officer Ken Malach, Executive Vice President Matt Rissell et al. Incorporated in Idaho 10/12/1988.
- 2. AnalyzeSoft, Inc., 7655 West Riverside Drive, Unit 1, Boise, Idaho 83714. Telephone: (208) 908-4440. Chief Executive Officer Arup Patranabish, Chief Operating Officer Harry Platt Thompson, Vice President of Operations David McCauley. Incorporated in Idaho 12/22/2003.
- 3. Suchetha Alety (IDOC staff #0701), IDOC user name: salety. Indian Foreign National – Nonimmigrant Worker status approved by Immigration & Naturalization through 8/13/2011. Home address: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] Background check done 12/20/2008.



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<p>4. Manish Bharambe (IDOC staff #0699), IDOC user name: mbharamb. Indian Foreign National – Nonimmigrant Worker status approved by Immigration & Naturalization through 8/31/2010. Home [REDACTED] SSN: [REDACTED] Background check done 12/31/2008.</p>	
<p>5. Vijayakumar Kanmanthareddy (IDOC staff #0600), IDOC user name: vkanmant. Indian Foreign National – Nonimmigrant Worker status approved by Immigration & Naturalization through unknown date. Home address: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Background check done 5/12/2009.</p>	<p>No Photo Available</p>
<p>6. Ramesh Krishnan (IDOC staff #0640), IDOC user name: rkrishna. Indian Foreign National – Nonimmigrant Worker status approved by Immigration & Naturalization through 5/31/2010. Home address: [REDACTED]. SSN: [REDACTED] Background check done 3/3/2009.</p>	
<p>7. Arup Patranabish (IDOC staff #9147), IDOC user name: apatrana. Chief Executive Officer of AnalyzeSoft, Inc. Became a Naturalized Citizen of the U.S. on 9/24/2009 (born in India). Home address: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Association with IDOC began on 7/2/2006.</p>	
<p>8. Sendhil Sampath (IDOC staff #0702), IDOC user name: ssampath. Indian Foreign National – Nonimmigrant Worker status approved by Immigration & Naturalization through 5/31/2010. Home address: [REDACTED] SSN: [REDACTED] Background check done 12/31/2008.</p>	

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<p>9. Chowdhry Saravanaperumal (IDOC staff #9346), IDOC user name: schowdhr. Indian Foreign National – Nonimmigrant Worker status approved by Immigration & Naturalization through 6/1/2010. Home [REDACTED] SSN: [REDACTED] Background check done 4/12/2007.</p>	
<p>10. Prasanth Vijayan (IDOC staff #0627), IDOC user name: pvijayan. Indian Foreign National – Nonimmigrant Worker status approved by Immigration & Naturalization through 5/31/2010. Home address: [REDACTED] SSN: [REDACTED] Background check done 3/16/2009.</p>	

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WITNESS(ES) AND/OR PEOPLE INTERVIEWED	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
14. Malach, Ken, Chief Operating Officer, CRI Advantage, Inc., 12754 LaSalle Street, Boise, Idaho. Telephone: (208) 343-9192.	
16. [REDACTED].	
17. McCauley, David, Vice President, Operations, AnalyzeSoft, Inc., 7655 West Riverside Drive, Unit 1, Boise, Idaho. Telephone: (208) 908-4440.	
18. [REDACTED].	
19. Patranabish, Arup (former IDOC staff #9147), Chief Executive Officer and President, AnalyzeSoft, Inc., 7655 West Riverside Drive, Unit 1, Boise, Idaho. Telephone: (208) 908-4440.	
20. [REDACTED].	
21. Thompson, Harry (Platt), Chief Operating Officer, AnalyzeSoft, Inc., 7655 West Riverside Drive, Unit 1, Boise, Idaho. Telephone: (208) 908-4440.	
22. [REDACTED].	
(Unless otherwise noted, all witnesses were working at 1299 North Orchard, #110, Boise, Idaho 83706.)	

CASE NARRATIVE

1. On February 23, 2010, OPS received information from [REDACTED] regarding allegations that certain IT contractors were working on projects for clients other than IDOC while on IDOC time using IDOC equipment. It was further alleged that the contractor, CRI Advantage, Inc., and their subcontractor, Analyze Soft, Inc., had

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engaged in fraudulent billing practices related to this work. [REDACTED] provided the following relevant documents (Attachment #1):

- a. Memo from [REDACTED] dated 2/18/2010 – background and details on suspicions regarding the activities of the contractors reported to [REDACTED] in December 2009. Due to [REDACTED] suspicions, a key-logging software, Spector Pro, was installed on the laptop and desktop computers used by six of the contracted developers. [REDACTED] stated that the contractors had an agreement with ASI to work on IDOC issues for eight hours and then on ACOMS issues for two hours; and that they were paid for ten hours of work per day. [REDACTED] described a meeting that was held on 1/6/2010, which included [REDACTED] and ASI corporate officers Arup Patranabish and Platt Thompson to discuss [REDACTED] concerns. [REDACTED] outlined the results found on the Spector Pro software and provided examples of the activity of the contractors.
 - b. Summary of the meeting held on 1/6/2010 – Identified Thompson and Patranabish from ASI and [REDACTED] as being present at this meeting. Issues discussed included excessive telephone calls taken by the contractors in the stairwell, frequent meetings held “downtown,” the absences of contractor Patrick Schwarz, contractors’ use of the ACOMS and Mantis urls. It was agreed that any further access of ACOMS or Mantis would be cleared with [REDACTED] prior to the contractors’ use of these programs. According to the summary, Patranabish and Thompson stated that they were unaware of the excessive nature of the telephone calls and agreed to limit them. Schwarz’s absence was explained as a misunderstanding and discussion regarding the use of Schwarz’s services was delayed to a future date. The contractors’ use of ACOMS and Mantis were justified as attempts to find solutions for IDOC issues. All parties agreed that the IDOC equipment used by the contractors would not be removed from the building except in some specified, pre-approved cases.
 - c. E-mail to Alaska DOC [REDACTED] Donald Brand dated 12/27/2009 authored by [REDACTED] and response from Brand dated 12/28/2009 – Brand confirmed that ASI uses Mantis to track the “bugs” in the Alaska system. [REDACTED] stated that ASI has used a number of contractors during their project, but that [REDACTED] believed “Ramesh” was their primary programmer and that “Chowdhry” also worked on their system. Brand explained that [REDACTED] could not identify who worked on specific pieces of ACOMS because the billing statements were not itemized by individual, but by function.
 - d. Five pages of screen shots – Evidence to indicate the usage of Mantis and activity in ACOMS including several e-mails of Alaska files being transmitted on Idaho servers.
 - e. Seven pages of invoices submitted by CRI, from 1/19/2010 to 2/5/2010 – provided as examples of billing documents.
2. On February 23, 2010, [REDACTED] provided OPS with a copy of a memo dated 2/17/2010 (Attachment #2) directed to [REDACTED]

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████████ along with copies of several e-mails received from Arup Patranabish (see Attachment #15 for listing). The memo and e-mails contained the following relevant information:

- a. ██████████ referenced the meeting held on 1/6/2010 and stated that ██████████ instructed IT Operations to install the key-logging software on the contractors' computers prior to that meeting. After reviewing the results of the key-logging software, ██████████ and ██████████ determined that inappropriate usage of the computers had occurred
 - b. ██████████ offered the following options to address IDOC's relationship with ASI:
 1. Terminate the contract with ASI – identified as high risk in the impact to the implementation schedule for CIS. ██████████ cited the loss of four years of experience with CIS as a major consideration in ASI continuing.
 2. Continue utilizing ASI services, but with controls in place – would require “locking down” the computers, but would have much less impact on the CIS implementation. ██████████ stated, *Potential risks are employed in three ways; first there's a small possibility of disgruntled contractor sabotage, second, should this scenario ever “get out”, there a possible perception of impropriety by continuing to do business with folks who have “stolen from the state” during this most recent budget crises, and lastly, there's risk in continuing to trust in the integrity of this company and the status reports they deliver.* (Typed verbatim.)
 - c. ██████████ summarization of the situation included the statements that IDOC has a “very good working relationship with ASI” and that the success of CIS and NCOMS is due to ASI's involvement. ██████████ also stated that ██████████ has found the most recent developments “very disturbing.”
 - d. E-mail from Patranabish dated 2/16/2010 at 6:27 PM to ██████████ – Offer of a credit against outstanding invoices of approximately \$98,000 for work performed in January and February 2010, removal of Saravanaperumal from IDOC projects, and personal supervision of the contractors by Patranabish. This e-mail also contains an outline of the work purportedly performed by the contractors in January and February 2010 as proof that services were being rendered to IDOC, and an assurance that ASI will meet the CIS deadline of April 2010.
3. On February 24, 2010, ██████████ provided a list of the contractors that ██████████ could recall working in the IDOC building. The list included: current contractors Sendhil Sampath, Suchetha Alety, Prasanth Vijayan, Chowdhry Saravanaperumal, Vijayakumar Kanmanthareddy and Patrick Schwarz; previous contractors: Cyndi Stegall, John Sorenson, David Libke and Manish Bharambe; and ASI managers: Arup Patranabish, David McCauley and Platt Thompson. Based on this list, I reviewed the personnel files maintained by IDOC Human Resources (HR). These files contained the initial background questionnaires and results of the background checks on each of the contractors. Information in the files indicated that all the Indian foreign national contractors had proper paperwork and identification for permission to work in the U.S. during the time they were performing work for IDOC.

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4. On February 24, 2010, I obtained access to the current e-mail accounts of all the contractors listed in Report Section #3. A review of the e-mails contained in these accounts yielded only a few items of evidentiary value. (See Attachments #12 and #15 for listing.) Several of the accounts appeared to have been completely emptied of their contents. During this search, it became evident that several of the contractors still had connectivity to the IDOC e-mail system through their cellular telephones and could potentially access their IDOC e-mail accounts. I immediately requested that all the accounts be deactivated. I also requested that IT provide me with access to e-mail files for the period beginning 1/1/2009. These files were ordered from the archives and restored for my use. (See Report Section #27).

5. On February 24, 2010, I reviewed the “shared drive” (Shared on ‘Admin\Vol1\Apps’(S:)) folders contained on the IDOC internal network. The following contractors’ folders were resident on the shared drive, identified as: “prasanth,” “senthil,” “suchetha,” and “Vijay.” These folders appeared to contain files with titles that referenced non-IDOC projects. My ability to view the actual file contents was limited due to the files being written in programming languages such as JAVA. These files were preserved on a DVD-R (Exhibit A).

6. An Administrative Allegation/Complaint Form was signed by Director Brent Reinke on 2/25/2010 (Attachment #3), and I was assigned to investigate this case.

7. On 2/25/2010, I conducted an informal interview with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for the purposes of familiarizing myself with the status of the CIS implementation and the alleged activities of the contractors. During that interview, [REDACTED] provided the following relevant documents and information:
 - a. E-mail to Information [REDACTED] dated 3/3/2009 authored by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had observed Saravanaperumal working on documentation for the state of Missouri. [REDACTED] expressed [REDACTED] concern regarding what [REDACTED] perceived as a conflict of interest (Attachment #4).
 - b. Statement to [REDACTED] dated 10/22/2009 authored by [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] overheard a conference call with two of the ASI contractors on the previous day. [REDACTED] believed that the individual on the other end of the call was someone named “David.” [REDACTED] said that their discussion included strategies for ASI to maximize their position within NCOMS to develop proprietary software. [REDACTED] believed this call was unethical and an inappropriate use of IDOC time, and stated that this was not a one-time incident. [REDACTED] described calls of this kind as “distracting” to employees in the immediate work area. A handwritten note at the bottom of this statement dated 10/26/2009 indicates that [REDACTED] spoke with Saravanaperumal and sent an e-mail to Patranabish requesting that meetings of this kind be held at ASI’s offices rather than at IDOC (Attachment #5).

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- c. ██████ stated that ██████ believed ██████ had also reported concerns to IDOC HR, but ██████ did not know the nature of ██████ complaints.
 - d. E-mail to Patranabish dated 10/26/2009 authored by ██████ – Request that ASI business be scheduled at the downtown office, and that when calls at IDOC are necessary, they be conducted in a specific location to minimize the impact on IDOC employees (Attachment #6).
 - e. E-mail to Patranabish dated 12/11/2009 authored by ██████ – Request that ASI suspend their downtown meetings until after New Year’s. Statement that with all the meetings, phone calls and Alaska issues ██████ did not believe the contractors were giving IDOC their full attention (Attachment #7).
 - f. E-mail to ██████ dated 12/27/2009 authored by ██████ – Request to have the security software (key-logger) installed on the contractors’ computers because of ██████ suspicions of double billing. ██████ expressed ██████ concern over the ACOMS and Mantis work being performed by the contractors on IDOC time, and a reiteration of ██████ request made to Patranabish to discontinue the downtown meetings and his lack of response to this request (Attachment #8).
 - g. A two-page document dated 2/16/2010 entitled “Regroup with Contractors Meeting” – ██████ identified page one of this document as the script ██████ used when the contractors were escorted from the IDOC building. This script included instructions that they were not to touch their computers while leaving their work areas and the statement that ASI management was being informed of their removal. Page two of this document is the original rough draft that ██████ prepared and reviewed with IDOC legal counsel (Attachment #9).
 - h. ██████ said that ██████ began reviewing the CRI invoices shortly after the 1/6/2010 meeting with ASI. ██████ explained that from ██████ understanding the billings were supposed to reflect the actual hours worked by each contractor. ██████ found inconsistencies between the hours billed for some of the contractors and the actual hours they were working. ██████ noted that on one occasion, IDOC was billed for a contractor that was out of the country on vacation.
 - i. ██████ stated that once the contractors were removed from the building on 2/16/2010, the hard drives were removed from their computers by ██████ ██████ for the purposes of securing them in evidence.
 - j. ██████ also provided information about the roles and responsibilities of each of the IDOC IT staff members ██████ stated that ██████ would be off work for a period of time and recommended that ██████ be interviewed prior to ██████ departure.
8. On February 25, 2010, at approximately 4:06 PM, I interviewed IDOC ██████ ██████), in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit D), ██████ provided the following relevant information:

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- a. [REDACTED] has been employed by IDOC since [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] immediate supervisor. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Initially, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was going to manage the completion of CIS phase one and that [REDACTED] would be managing phase two. [REDACTED] later told [REDACTED] to go ahead and get involved in phase one. When asked what [REDACTED] responsibilities are, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] developed a schedule for the project that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] agreed to, but the contractors were the ones that were actually doing the required work. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] also does some analysis to ensure that the contractors were writing code that would fit IDOC's needs.
- b. [REDACTED] explained that one of the challenges with CIS was the process of converting the old system to a new system. [REDACTED] could not understand why this was taking so long to accomplish. The contractors "blamed" the slowness on the lack of "requirements" provided by IDOC staff. [REDACTED] believed that the contractors had been working on the system longer than any of the IDOC staff developers and that they knew more about it. However, the contractors were not providing adequate information about what they were doing so that IDOC staff could understand the coding. [REDACTED] said that because no documentation existed, IDOC staff were spending some of their time re-creating and tracking down information. [REDACTED] described the conversion issues as "complex," and said that one of the contractors knew the old system and was tasked with the conversion. [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] was actually working from Montana (later identified as Patrick Schwarz), and that [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that they "didn't need to worry about learning the system because [REDACTED] (Schwarz) knew it." [REDACTED] was uncomfortable with the level of control and trust that was being placed in the contractors. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] about cross training with the contractors, and [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that they would do that sometime later.
- c. [REDACTED] contact with the contractors has been mostly limited to questions regarding CIS processes. [REDACTED] has spoken with Chowdhry Saravanaperumal on several occasions because [REDACTED] was the "lead" on the project. [REDACTED] described a number of problems in [REDACTED] communication with the Saravanaperumal, including his absences from IDOC, the length of time to receive a response from him and the readability of the information [REDACTED] provided. [REDACTED] said that when [REDACTED] asked him specific questions, [REDACTED] would indicate that [REDACTED] would provide the information and appeared helpful, but did not deliver.
- d. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was familiar with Arup Patranabish from other work in the Boise IT community. [REDACTED] said that Patranabish talked to [REDACTED] several times since [REDACTED] has been at IDOC, but never about the CIS project. [REDACTED] said that on two different occasions [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] questions about [REDACTED] former employer, the [REDACTED]; and wanted to know what kind of IT help they needed, and who [REDACTED] should talk to about working for them. Every time [REDACTED] tried to ask Patranabish questions about the CIS project, [REDACTED] avoided [REDACTED] by stating that they were handling everything and [REDACTED] did not need to worry about it.
- e. [REDACTED] also asked Patranabish for information on the progress of the modularization project. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that they were working on it and that everything was fine. [REDACTED] stated that ASI did not provide any actual information on their progress or coding. [REDACTED] recalled a

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- conversation [REDACTED] had with [REDACTED], in which [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had finally gotten to look at the database. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] it was “depressing” and estimated that [REDACTED] could have accomplished the same tasks in about one and one-half days.
- f. [REDACTED] stated that the coding documentation provided by ASI was inadequate and did not meet accepted industry standards.
- g. [REDACTED] stated that the quality of the ASI work “wasn’t really as good as it should have been.” [REDACTED] said that once the contractors were moved from the modularization project to the CIS implementation, they should have been able to accomplish more work and meet the deadlines, but that did not happen. [REDACTED] identified Suchetha (Alety) and Vijay (Kanmanthareddy) as two contractors that appeared to be completing some tasks. [REDACTED] described the process of releasing code, testing it and returning it with errors to be fixed. [REDACTED] was not aware of any time that the code did not get returned multiple times and believed that the contractors were just rushing to “throw something over the wall” to make it look like they were accomplishing things. [REDACTED] said that for “senior” level developers, this should not be happening.
- h. [REDACTED] said that ASI was not able to meet any of the deadlines set for them. [REDACTED] expressed frustration over the delays and excuses [REDACTED] was provided for why the project was not moving forward. [REDACTED] was never given an actual reason why the deadlines were pushed out. [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] did not know a lot about the system or IDOC’s requirements, but stated that things did not seem to be moving forward.
- i. [REDACTED] did not personally see any of the contractors working on projects other than IDOC. [REDACTED] did notice that they were very furtive about documents that were printed on the printers in IT.
- j. Shortly after coming to work for IDOC, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that they were really lucky to be able to use ASI’s services since they were not an approved state vendor. [REDACTED] explained to [REDACTED] that CRI was the actual approved state vendor and that ASI worked through them. [REDACTED] said this sounded “fishy” to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has never had any contact with anyone from CRI nor has [REDACTED] ever heard about CRI being in the building.
- k. [REDACTED] said that there was the perception that the contractors were held in higher regard than the IDOC staff. [REDACTED] cited the following as evidence of this: contractors were permitted to work from home and provided with tokens for remote log in, and they were given better equipment than the IDOC staff. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] complained about the two IDOC subject matter experts ([REDACTED]) being permitted to work from home, but [REDACTED] continued to allow the contractors to do this. This did not make sense to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not believe that the contractors were being held accountable. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that the contractors reported to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not know whether this meant that [REDACTED] was responsible for them or not.
- l. [REDACTED] stated that IDOC has lost a lot of knowledge by removing the contractors, but that [REDACTED] believed the IDOC IT staff were more committed to the success of the project and that they “would figure it out.” [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was glad the contractors were gone.
- m. Interview concluded at approximately 4:34 PM.

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9. On February 26, 2010, I requested that [REDACTED] contact CRI to obtain a copy of their subcontractor agreement with ASI. During [REDACTED] discussion with CRI Chief Operating Officer Ken Malach, Malach informed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was unaware that the ASI contractors had been removed from the IDOC work site.
10. On February 26, 2010, I requested financial information from [REDACTED]. During our discussion, [REDACTED] stated that sometime in the summer of 2009, Arup Patranabish and Platt Thompson met with [REDACTED] and requested information regarding the status of the federal grant funds, specifically how much money was remaining in the grant. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not respond to their questions, but reported their interest to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] provided payment records related to CIS and vendor information for CRI and Patranabish along with copies of purchase orders related to CIS. These records contained the following relevant information:
- a. Invoices paid to CRI during calendar year 2009 through 1/15/2010 from general fund PCA 1321-Correctional Integrated System totaled \$427,852.
 - b. Invoices paid to CRI during calendar year 2009 through 1/15/2010 from offender management fund PCA 1327-Management Information Systems totaled \$31,500.
 - c. Invoices paid to CRI during calendar year 2009 through 1/15/2010 from federal grant fund PCA 1338-CIS Byrne grant totaled \$865,362.
 - d. Purchase orders associated with CIS indicated that two “resources” were hired to work exclusively on CIS and other IDOC systems as necessary. They were to have extensive experience in JAVA programming and other specific skills, and were to provide training on the program to IDOC staff members.
 - e. Purchase orders associated with the NCOMS project indicated that IDOC purchased specialized programming software and associated licenses, computer equipment and office equipment for the contractors’ use.
11. On February 26, 2010, I requested information from IDOC HR regarding complaints made by [REDACTED]. I was provided with a copy of a three-page unsigned, undated document that [REDACTED] was purported to have submitted on or about 2/9/2010 (Attachment #10). (It was later confirmed in [REDACTED] formal interview that [REDACTED] had authored this complaint.) The document contained a list of [REDACTED] concerns regarding the contracted IT staff and the work environment in IT:
- a. The quality of the work performed by contracted IT staff was “marginal at best.”
 - b. There was no quality control on the code that contractors delivered.
 - c. Contractors were frequently working on projects unrelated to IDOC.
 - d. Contractors were frequently observed logging onto non-work related web sites.
 - e. ASI billed IDOC for work on the PREA module, but IDOC staff working on that module could find no evidence that any code had been produced.

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- f. ASI contractors being more favorably treated than IDOC staff. Examples of this were provided, such as contractors being permitted to work off-site, being provided with laptops for the purposes of working off-site, and [REDACTED] failure to hold the contractors to the same performance standards as IDOC staff.
- g. [REDACTED] permissive attitude towards a staff member's unauthorized removal of IDOC equipment from the building, to wit, a new digital camera.
- h. Comments made by [REDACTED] to Arup Patranabish regarding IDOC's successful grant award. [REDACTED] believed the conversation that occurred between [REDACTED] and Patranabish indicated that projects were being given to ASI rather than using the state bid process.
- i. The reallocation of resources within the federal grant to disguise the contractors' lack of progress on the CIS implementation.
- j. Several items on the list refer to [REDACTED] lack of management ability, accountability and respect for IDOC employees.

12. On February 26, 2010, I requested that the computer hard drives that were confiscated from the contractors be delivered to OPS. [REDACTED] informed me via e-mail that IT [REDACTED] had the hard drives in [REDACTED] possession, but that [REDACTED] had removed them from the IDOC building. OPS requested that the IT staff who had handled the hard drives provide written statements regarding their activities. Following is a summarization of the relevant information provided in these statements:

- a. [REDACTED] reported that around 4:00 PM on 2/16/2010 they physically took custody of the laptops and computers used by the contractors. On 2/17/2010, [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED] office and witnessed [REDACTED] copying and "imaging" the hard drives. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] had written the state tag number on each of the drives and placed them in a large lock box. From 2/17/2010 through 2/26/2010, [REDACTED] assumed that the hard drives were still in the lock box in [REDACTED] office. On 2/26/2010, [REDACTED] was surprised by IT [REDACTED] inquiry as to the location of the hard drives. [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] at approximately 9:30 AM and learned that [REDACTED] had the hard drives in his possession. [REDACTED] requested that [REDACTED] bring the hard drives back to the central office and deliver them to OPS.
- b. [REDACTED] reported that he was involved in a meeting on 2/16/2010 regarding the removal of the contractors from the IDOC building. [REDACTED] assumed that [REDACTED] would handle the confiscation of the computers in conjunction with [REDACTED] escorting the contractors from the building. [REDACTED] assumed that the computers would be "locked down" somewhere until a decision was made regarding the activities of the contractors. On 2/26/2010, [REDACTED] learned from [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had taken the hard drives home with [REDACTED].
- c. [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] attended a meeting on 2/16/2010 with [REDACTED] to discuss the plan for removing the contractors from the building and the necessity of copying their hard drives. It was determined that [REDACTED] would undertake the backing up

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of all data on the contractors' hard drives for the purposes of securing the coding work that had been accomplished thus far [REDACTED] identified four contractors, Chowdhry Saravanaperumal, Suchetha Alety, Vijayakumar Kanmanthareddy and Ramesh Krishnan whose computers were confiscated. On 2/17/2010 [REDACTED] submitted two laptops that [REDACTED] had previously received from contractors Prasanth Vijayan and Sendhil Sampath. [REDACTED] also received a laptop from [REDACTED] on or about 2/18/2010 that Patranabish had previously brought in. This laptop was identified as one that Saravanaperumal had been using for "support" in off-hours. [REDACTED] submitted this laptop to OPS on 2/26/2010.

- d. Though a written statement was requested from [REDACTED] on numerous occasions, it was not provided by the date of this report.
13. On February 26, 2010, OPS received six (6) hard drives from IT [REDACTED]. The hard drives were identified by state tag numbers 361615, 361894, 364616, 364617, 364618 and 364786. The hard drives were logged into evidence and secured in the OPS evidence locker.
14. On February 26, 2010, OPS received one (1) laptop computer from IT [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that this laptop was used offsite by Saravanaperumal and had been turned in to [REDACTED] one or two days after the contractors were removed from the IDOC building. The laptop was identified by state tag number 362614 and was logged into evidence and secured in the OPS evidence locker.
15. On March 1, 2010, [REDACTED] and I met with Chief Investigator Scott Birch of the Criminal Division of the Idaho Attorney General's Office to discuss the potential criminal aspects of this case. It was determined during that meeting that our office would proceed with the internal portion of the case and keep Birch apprised of any criminal issues that arose. Birch offered his support and assistance in conducting interviews and in staffing this case.
16. On March 2, 2010, [REDACTED] delivered a thumb drive to OPS containing the Spector Pro files (screen shots) that were created while the software was installed on the contractors' computers along with a written statement regarding the files contained thereon (Attachment #11). The Spector Pro viewer software was installed on laptops in the OPS work area to allow for viewing of the screen shots.
17. On March 3, 2010, [REDACTED] filed a public records request with the state of Alaska regarding information relevant to this investigation. Additionally, on 3/4/2010 through 3/6/2010, he spoke with a number of other states' investigators by telephone to determine if ASI or CRI had previously or were currently providing contracted services in their states. Following are the results of those contacts:

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- a. Larry Pacheco, IT Chief Information Officer, New Mexico DOC – no relationship with either company.
 - b. Vince Bocchino, IT Chief, Wyoming DOC – no relationship with either company.
 - c. Chris Pickering, Inspector General, Missouri DOC – they met with ASI, but did not contract with them.
 - d. John Lamb, Director of Enforcement and Investigations, Kansas DOC – no response.
 - e. John Doehrty, ██████████ Montana DOC – no contracts, but had a negative experience with both companies (not specified).
18. On March 8, 2010, I began reviewing the screen shots collected by the Spector Pro software (2009 Version 7.0.5307). Approximately 314,089 screen shots captured what was visually displayed on the computer screen every 20 seconds, on a page or window change, when a new program is opened, or when other "triggers" occurred. ██████████
- ██████████ also reviewed screen shots. The results of the reviews are summarized here in consideration for the reader. Of particular note is the activity that occurred after the meeting on 1/6/2010 in which IDOC informed ASI of the inappropriate behavior of their contractors and asked them to cease these activities (see Attachment #1). More specific information and actual printouts of the screen shots are contained in the OPS files (see Attachment #12 for listing).
- a. Suchetha Alety (srvenmac-Sucheta (on Exhibit G) – screen shots from 1/11/2010, 8:41 AM to 2/16/2010, 11:28 AM (numbering 1 through 147,780). Alety worked regularly on ACOMS inmate banking and "BOPP" as well as frequently logging into the Mantis tracking software. There are screen shots that provide examples of the connections used by the contractors to access the Alaska project. On 2/1/2010 Alety displayed a list indicating that two of the ACOMS server connections were running through "idocprod" and "cis." It appears that Alety took ██████████ computer out of the building on the weekends of 1/16/2010, 1/23/2010, 1/30/2010 and 2/6/2010 and worked on ACOM's issues. It also appears that Alety removed the computer from the building on several weeknights after 1/6/2010 to work on ACOMS and personal projects including ██████████ resume.
 - b. Vijayakumar Kanmanthareddy (movuxnt-Vijay) (on Exhibit H) – screen shots from 12/31/2009, 12:47 PM to 2/16/2010, 9:46 AM (numbering 1 through 10,449). Kanmanthareddy spent a limited amount of time working on ACOMS corrections through the Mantis software. There does not appear to be very much work product of any kind produced during the available screen shots. Kanmanthareddy frequently visited social networking, shopping and news sites. It also appears that he took the laptop on a trip to Las Vegas on 12/31/2009 and spent a significant amount of time surfing the Internet during his weekend there. There are no screen shots captured between 1/4/2010 and 2/11/2010 because it appears that Kanmanthareddy reinstalled his operating system as of 12/31/2009 on 1/4/2010. The 12/31/2009 date was prior to the installation of Spector Pro. Spector Pro was re-installed on the computer on 2/11/2010. On 2/12/2010

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Kanmanthareddy uninstalled several unauthorized programs including DivX Plus Web Player and SoundMax.

- c. Sendhil Sampath (biodudlg-Senthil) (on Exhibit I) – screen shots from 12/31/2009, 12:02 PM to 1/26/2010, 3:41 PM (numbering 1 through 37,859). Sampath worked regularly on the programming of both ACOMS and IDOC CIS with frequent after-hours work performed on ACOMS. It appears that this computer was taken off-site on 1/9/2010 for the weekend. On 1/11/2010 the ASI and ACOMS files were systematically deleted off of this computer. After 1/11/2010, Sampath logged onto this computer only two additional times, on 1/22/2010 and 1/26/2010.
 - d. Chowdhry Saravanaperumal (geteuni-Chowdhry) (on Exhibit J) – screen shots from 12/31/2009, 1:52 PM to 2/4/2010, 6:51 PM (numbering 1 through 7,376). It appears that this computer was most frequently used to connect remotely to perform work on ACOMS. Some of this work occurred after-hours, but the majority was between 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM on weekdays. On 2/2, 3 & 4/2010 the only screen shots recorded appear to be files that were accessed in the NCOMS database.
 - e. Chowdhry Saravanaperumal (gifownt-Chowdhry) (on Exhibit J) – screen shots from 2/10/2010, 6:35 AM to 2/16/2010, 9:23 AM (numbering 1 through 11,461). A large portion of the screen shots on this computer are of program set-up work performed by IDOC staff such as the installation of a new version of GroupWise. The screen shots that can be attributed to Saravanaperumal are mostly of IDOC CIS issues and internal e-mails with IDOC staff.
 - f. Prasanth Vijayan (exepourl-Prasanth) (on Exhibit I) – screen shots from 12/31/2009, 12:58 PM to 1/26/2010, 10:18 PM (numbering 1 through 99,164). The presence of unauthorized software such as AIM 6, TeamViewer 4, Viewpoint Media Player, and Skype. It appears that most of the work performed by Vijayan was on IDOC CIS projects such as the offender name badges, the PSI module, cost of supervision and inmate banking. Vijayan spent a significant amount of time on social networking sites, news services, shopping and banking sites. He spent a significant amount of time searching for other employment and in looking at information regarding dairy farming. It appears that Vijayan worked on this computer during the weekend of 1/9/2010, and spent most of that time on IDOC CIS projects. He removed the computer from the building for after-hours use on 1/12, 14, 18, 20 and 25/2010, and most of the screen shots from these dates indicate ACOMS work and personal use. On 1/26/2010 Vijayan appeared to be deleting ACOMS files from this computer and from the IDOC servers. It also appears that he copied a large number of these files to a device connected to the “E:” drive prior to their deletion.
19. On March 10, 2010, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and I delivered six (6) hard drives (state tag numbers 364786, 364618, 364617, 364616, 361894 and 364615) to the Intermountain West Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (IWRFCFL) at 877 West Main Street, Suite 404, Boise, Idaho. OPS submitted a Service Request form to have the hard drives imaged for the purposes of retrieving any items of evidentiary value (Attachment #13).

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20. On March 10, 2010, in an attempt to determine if ASI contractors had breached the security of the IDOC firewall, I requested printouts of network logs from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] informed me that this request would result in thousands of pages of data and a significant investment of his staff's time to produce readable logs, and estimated it would take two to three months to compile the requested information. [REDACTED] offered no alternative methods of detecting security breaches.
21. On March 17, 2010, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] delivered one (1) laptop computer (state tag number 362614) to the IWRCFL at 877 West Main Street, Suite 404, Boise, Idaho. This laptop was appended to the original Service Request filed on 3/10/2010.
22. On March 17, 2010, IDOC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] provided OPS with token usage logs for the three tokens (numbers 104774057, 45050149 and 100451953) issued to the contractors. The following relevant information was located in the logs (all specific log-ins are recorded on the activity spreadsheet (Attachment #12)):
- a. Token number 104774057 – used by Arup Patranabish from 5/1/2009 through 2/24/2010 – unsuccessfully attempted to log on with the token on 5/5/2009. No other usage recorded.
 - b. Token number 45050149 – used by Vijaykumar Kanmantareddy from 6/5/2009 through 11/15/2009 – extensive usage occurred in June and July of 2009 including frequent weeknight log-ons.
 - c. Token number 100451953 – used by Chowdhry Saravanaperumal from 5/15/2009 through 3/17/2010 – extensive usage occurred in June, July and August of 2009 including frequent late night and early morning log ons throughout the week.
23. On March 18, 2010, I received a list of IDOC equipment and other items that appeared to be missing and were assumed to be in the possession of the contractors. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] communicated with Arup Patranabish several times via e-mail between 3/19/2010 and 3/23/2010 to request the return of the missing items no later than 3/30/2010. The final list included two (2) laptop computers (state tag numbers 362724 and 364532), three (3) access tokens (numbers 104775057, 45050149, 100451953), and one (1) flat screen monitor (state tag number 361540). [REDACTED] also requested a compact-disc copy of the CIS medical module code. Patranabish agreed to return the equipment on 3/29/2010.
24. On March 23, 2010, I met with Computer Forensic Examiner Lon Anderson of IWRCFL at his office at 877 West Main Street, Suite 404, Boise, Idaho, to discuss the preliminary results of the computer forensic examination requested on 3/10/2010 (Attachment #13). Anderson requested that I provide him with “search terms” for the purpose of extracting relevant information from the retrieved data. Search terms selected were: ACOMS, Arup, CRI, Cyndi, Mantis, Patranabish, Stegall, and Texas. Additionally, types of files to be retrieved

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included: GroupWise Chats, Excel Files, spreadsheets and zip files. Anderson explained that once the sort functions were completed, the results could be viewed and tagged for inclusion in the final summary. Because many of the files appeared on more than one of the hard drives, the tagging process would prevent duplication selections of the same files. He also stated that the contents of the hard drives would be permanently retained in the IWRCFL office in Salt Lake City, Utah.

25. On March 23, 2010, OPS received a package of documents from Internal Auditor Kevin Worley of the Alaska DOC. This package contained the following relevant documents (see Attachment #15 for document listing):

- a. Invoices from CRI from 3/2/2009 to 1/27/2010 totaling \$1,184,750.
- b. Invoices from ASI from 11/16/2009 to 3/3/2010 totaling \$395,650.
- c. Letter to Don Brand dated 9/23/2008 authored by ASI's then Vice President of Business Development William Oldham summarizing the project agreement for modifications to core functions associated with specific modules, totaling \$1,458,600 with a completion date of July 2009.
- d. Statement of Work for the OTIS to CIS conversion project between CRI and the Alaska DOC dated 10/1/2008. This document indicates that CRI's status as an approved vendor for the State of Alaska was based on Idaho contract SBPO1245-03 and cited Idaho Title 67, Chapter 23, Section 27. Attached to this Statement of Work were a number of documents outlining the specific tasks that ASI would be performing.
- e. Statement of Work for the WinPho Replacement Project dated 5/1/2009 between CRI and the Alaska DOC. This document indicates that CRI's status as an approved vendor for the State of Alaska was based on Idaho contract SBPO1245-04 and cited Idaho Title 67, Chapter 23, Section 27.
- f. Standard Agreement Form for Professional Services between ASI and Alaska DOC for work to be performed from 10/15/2009 through 6/30/2010 signed on 10/16/2009.
- g. Verification that the following were known to them as contractors: Ramesh Krishnan, David McCauley, Arup Patranabish, Patrick Schwarz, John Sorenson, Platt Thompson and Prasanth Vijayan.

26. On March 29, 2010, [REDACTED] and I retrieved computer equipment and other items from Arup Patranabish at the ASI offices at 7655 West Riverside Drive, Unit 1, Boise, Idaho. Patranabish appeared friendly and cooperative during this process. Patranabish and I each checked the serial numbers of the items retrieved and signed a receipt form (Attachment #14). The following items were received in good condition:

- a. Two(2) laptops, state tag numbers 362724 and 364532,
- b. Three (3) access tokens, numbers 104774057, 45050149, and 100451953, and
- c. One (1) flat-screen computer monitor, state tag number 361540.

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27. On April 9, 2010, I was informed that the contractors' IDOC e-mail accounts for the period beginning in January 2009 had been restored and were available for review. The results of the reviews are summarized here in consideration for the reader. More specific information and actual printouts of the e-mails are contained in the OPS files (See Attachments #12 and #15 for listing). During the review of the e-mails it appeared that some of the contractors were shifting their e-mail usage to g-mail accounts and other web mail providers.

- a. E-mails from John Sorenson, Vice President of Operations – Earliest e-mail found – 6/4/2009, sent from john.sorenson@analyzesoftinc.com to various ASI contractors at IDOC e-mail addresses; “Subject: ACOMS weekly call today – Cancelled.” Between 6/4/2009 and 8/13/2009 there were approximately nineteen e-mails sent from Sorenson’s e-mail address to ASI staff at IDOC e-mail addresses. More than half of these e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM. Most of the e-mails sent by Sorensen refer to ACOMS project deadlines including some deadlines that occurred during IDOC normal work hours.
- b. E-mails from Cynthia Stegall, Sr. Solutions Analyst (cyndi.stegall@analyzesofinc.com) – Between 6/5/2009 and 1/28/2010 there were approximately forty-eight e-mails sent from Stegall’s e-mail address to ASI contractors at IDOC e-mail addresses. Four of these e-mails were sent on a Saturday or Sunday, all but two of the remaining e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM. Most of the e-mails sent by Stegall refer to specific ACOMS issues and the Mantis bug tracking software. Stegall mentions various deadlines for the ACOMS project and appears to be responsible for ACOMS “builds” that were scheduled for every Thursday at 5:00 PM and required that all ACOMS code be “checked in” by 4:00 PM on Thursdays. It also appeared that at least one of these builds was rescheduled for noon, specifically on 12/24/2009; and required the cooperation and input of all the ASI contractors.
- c. E-mails from David McCauley, Vice President, Operations, ASI (david.Mccauley@analyzesoftinc.com) – Between 10/19/2009 and 2/9/2010 there were approximately eight e-mails sent from McCauley’s e-mail address to ASI contractors at IDOC e-mail addresses. Three of these e-mails referenced deadlines for work on ASI’s business web site, two requested that the contractors perform weekend work for ACOMS and three were congratulatory messages for the work performed on ACOMS. Four of the e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
- d. E-mails from Platt Thompson, Chief Operating Officer, ASI (platt.thompson@analyzesoftinc.com) – Between 8/11/2009 and 12/27/2009 there were approximately three e-mails sent from Thompson’s e-mail address to ASI staff at IDOC e-mail addresses. All of these e-mails are congratulating ASI staff on a “job well done” for their work on ACOMS. Two of these e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
- e. E-mails from Vijayakumar Kanmantareddy, contractor (vkanmant@idoc.idaho.gov) – Between 11/27/2009 and 12/24/2009 there were approximately five e-mails sent from Kanmantareddy’s e-mail address to ASI contractors at IDOC e-mail addresses. All of

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- these e-mails related to the development of the inmate banking software in Alaska and were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
- f. E-mails from Kondaiah Nallapati, employee of ASI (knallapati@analyzesoftinc.com) – Two e-mails were sent between 9/9/2009 and 10/27/2009 from Nallapati’s e-mail address to ASI contractors at IDOC e-mail addresses. The e-mail of 9/9/2009 was entitled “New ACOMS Branch” and included an attachment providing instructions on setting up the ACOMS environment. Kondaiah instructed the contractors to “point” to this new branch for the purposes of processing ACOMS changes. The e-mail of 10/27/2009 contained the minutes of an ASI team meeting. The minutes include specific information about ASI’s activities including reference to Krishnan working on ACOMS. Both these e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
 - g. E-mails from Ramesh Krishnan, contractor (ramesh@analyzesoftinc.com) – Between 7/23/2009 and 12/10/2009 there were approximately eleven e-mails sent from Krishnan’s e-mail address to ASI contractors at IDOC e-mail addresses. Most of the e-mails sent by Krishnan refer to specific ACOMS issues, the Mantis bug tracking software and instructions regarding ACOMS builds. In an e-mail dated 12/4/2009, Krishnan informed the contractors that the ACOMS builds would be increased to two per week until 12/17/2009. All eleven of these e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
 - h. E-mails from Sendhil Sampath, contractor (ssampath@idoc.idaho.gov) – Between 8/7/2009 and January 7, 2010 there were approximately nine e-mail sent from Sampath’s e-mail address to ASI contractors at IDOC e-mail addresses and to ASI personnel at ASI e-mail addresses. Most of these e-mails relate to specific Mantis issues and portions of the ACOMS project. Seven of these e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
 - i. E-mails from Chowdhry Saravanaperumal, contractor (schowdhr@idoc.idaho.gov or chowdhry@analyzesoftinc.com) – Between 12/16/2009 and 12/24/2009 there were only two e-mails sent from Saravanaperumal’s e-mail addresses to himself. Both these e-mails indicate that Saravanaperumal was transmitting attachments identified as “acoms.war” files. According to *FileInfo.com* “war” files are compressed packages of JAVA-based Web components and applications that are run on a Web server. Both of these e-mails were sent during weekdays between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
28. On April 10, 2010, [REDACTED] received a letter from CRI’s Vice President Matt Rissell. In his letter, Rissell stated that CRI valued their association with IDOC and their status as a preferred vendor for the state of Idaho, and requested a meeting to discuss possible alternatives in completing the CIS project. Rissell also indicated that ASI had informed CRI that they were removed from IDOC “due to IDOC budget reasons,” but had subsequently learned about the on-going investigation as the reason for the ASI’s removal (Attachment #16).

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- d. [REDACTED] described the modularization project as a “fixed bid.” [REDACTED] said that the contractors were required to complete the modularization at the agreed price no matter how long it took them to perform the work. [REDACTED] said that they received permission from the grantor to shift the work from modularization to the CIS implementation and that “negated” the contract. [REDACTED] believed that four of the contractors were shifted from the modularization over to the CIS project and explained that since the modularization was based on CIS; it needed to be completed before the modularization could be worked on.
- e. [REDACTED] was aware that they were going to miss the original CIS implementation deadline of September 2009, and [REDACTED] reported this to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] approximately one year ago. [REDACTED] said that the original implementation timeline was based on information supplied two years ago by [REDACTED] and was only intended to be an estimate. [REDACTED] stated that making estimations was difficult with a “system this large, especially if you don’t have all your requirements.” [REDACTED] explained that identifying the business requirements was essential for the project moving forward in a timely manner. [REDACTED] said that obtaining the requirements has been extremely difficult and that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were given a deadline of June 15, 2009 to supply them. He stated that as of a few months ago, he still did not have the necessary requirements.
- f. [REDACTED] described the IDOC programming staff as sub-standard because the department could not afford to hire experienced programmers. [REDACTED] stated that there were “a lot of things we did internally” to help them acquire the necessary skills, but they were not capable of working on CIS due to the complexity of the coding. [REDACTED] said that the contractors had the needed programming skills, and that all they needed to learn was the “business” part of CIS. [REDACTED] referred back to the lack of accurate requirements as a significant problem when explaining the business practices to the contractors. When asked to elaborate on the department’s efforts to provide training for the IDOC programming staff, [REDACTED] said that there were some JAVA classes that were offered “a long time ago” prior to the contractors coming on board. [REDACTED] said that once the contractors, specifically Patranabish, were familiar with the business, they provided one-on-one training for the IDOC staff. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had been involved in setting this type of training up and stated that they brought in a class on Jasper reports for the development staff.
- g. [REDACTED] explained that because NCOMS cannot receive funding as an entity, the grant funds for the NCOMS project flowed through IDOC. [REDACTED] stated that the modularization project was meant to benefit Idaho first, but then the code would be shared with all the members of the NCOMS consortium.
- h. When asked about the progress and current status of the projects, [REDACTED] said that CIS 1.0 was built from what was known as the Utah system. The goal of CIS 1.0 was to convert the Utah system, which was written in an older computer language to a web-based system language (JAVA) and convert the database from the Informix system. [REDACTED] said that originally they used \$860,000 of inmate management funds to “take Utah’s client system server to the web” and that these funds could only be used for this purpose. CIS version

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1.5 is the expansion of the system to change programming code inside the database. ■ said that CIS 2.0 is synonymous with the modularization project and will alter the actual architecture of the CIS system. ■ said that some of the NCOMS states have already started using CIS 1.0 to build new systems. ■ said that the modularization process would make it easier for the NCOMS states to use just the pieces of CIS that apply to them.

- i. ■ explained that the original two contractors, Patranabish and Saravanaperumal, were funded through general funds referred to as “staff augmentation.” ■ said that when they received additional funds, five more contractors were hired. ■ said that about one year ago Patranabish stopped providing direct services and another contractor was brought in. ■ identified this person as “Ramesh” (Krishnan) ■ believed that Krishnan was a programmer and an architect, which ■ said was a different skill set from the other contractors. When asked if ■ believed that Saravanaperumal was the lead contractor after Patranabish departed, ■ said that the contractors reported to ■ ■ believed that Saravanaperumal was equal to the other contractors, but that ■ had been here the longest.
- j. I provided ■ with a copy of the Statement of Work (SOW) agreement with CRI dated 4/2/2007, and asked ■ if it was the most recent SOW. ■ responded that the modularization SOW was more recent. When asked if the modularization SOW superseded the 4/2/2007 SOW, ■ initially said that it did, but then stated that ■ did not really know.
- k. When asked when ■ first became aware that there was an issue with the activities of the contractors, ■ said that ■ learned about it when ■ told him ■ believed the contractors were “double-dipping” sometime in December of 2009. ■ did not recall anyone specifically bringing up any concerns regarding the contractors prior to this. The only information he had regarding the contractors’ progress was contained in regular reports provided to him by ■ ■ stated that it was ■ responsibility to track the activities of the contractors. ■ did not personally see the contractors working on anything that ■ could identify as non-IDOC. I provided ■ with a copy of ■ e-mail dated 3/3/2009 (Attachment #4) and ■ stated that ■ did not remember receiving it. ■ knew that ASI had performed work for Kansas, Missouri and Alaska, but ■ believed they understood that they were not supposed to work on these projects on IDOC time. ■ said that he made this clear to Patranabish and Saravanaperumal “several times.” ■ recalled someone mentioning that they had seen “a web site or something was up on their screen, but um nothing to the effect they were programming or working on a code while they’re there.” ■ said that ■ did not know that ASI was working on non-IDOC projects.
- l. I provided ■ with a copy of Web Developer ■ statement to ■ dated 10/22/2009 (Attachment #5) and asked ■ if ■ had ever personally spoken with Patranabish about limiting the number of meetings and outside activities that the ASI contractors were engaging in. ■ said that it was ■ job to take care of

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- these issues. When asked again if [REDACTED] ever spoke with Patranabish about this issue, [REDACTED] stated, "Yes, I did. Just when he comes in, I said, 'hey, you can't be doing this.'"
- m. When asked how often Patranabish was coming to IDOC, [REDACTED] said that it depended on the "other things they were working on." [REDACTED] said Patranabish "came in quite a bit." [REDACTED] said that when Patranabish tried to talk to [REDACTED] about specific issues, [REDACTED] would redirect him to [REDACTED]
- n. When asked when [REDACTED] first had knowledge of the ACOMS project, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] believed it was some time last year. When asked if he knew of any other states that ASI was working for, [REDACTED] said, "they're not doing anything for Texas, but they were awarded a contract." [REDACTED] believed that ASI had talked to Oregon, but did not know of any other states besides Kansas and Missouri.
- o. [REDACTED] has not spoken to anyone at CRI about the investigation, but [REDACTED] talked to them about some of the IT issues and believed that they had met with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] recently. [REDACTED] has not spoken to anyone at ASI since they were removed from the building with the exception of Vice President McCauley who delivered some requested materials to [REDACTED]
- p. When asked how much information Patranabish was given regarding the federal grant award, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] was aware of "some things." [REDACTED] said that because Patranabish was part of the "staff augmentation," [REDACTED] probably had some knowledge of what was contained in the grant. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] wrote the grant and that [REDACTED] would have a better idea how much information Patranabish contributed to the technical part of the application. [REDACTED] recalled several other people being involved in writing the application such as former employees [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
- q. In reference to the OPS investigation in 2007 regarding Patranabish's activities, I asked [REDACTED] if [REDACTED] had changed any of the IT processes in response to the recommendations made in the investigation report. [REDACTED] believed that was when [REDACTED] began requesting a work-in-progress report. [REDACTED] also began having [REDACTED] and former [REDACTED] review the "PO's" that came from CRI. [REDACTED] met with Platt Thompson from CRI "quite often." [REDACTED] also recalled instituting the use of SourceForge to track the project progress. [REDACTED] could not recall any of the dates of these activities.
- r. When asked what [REDACTED] knew about ASI Chief Operating Officer Platt Thompson, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] became acquainted with Thompson after IDOC received the funds for staff augmentation. [REDACTED] met with the different IT vendors and Thompson was then working for CRI. Thompson was the contact person at CRI for IDOC, and [REDACTED] periodically met with him and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] believed Thompson left CRI and went to work for ASI about one year ago. When asked if [REDACTED] was aware that CRI told [REDACTED] that they were asked not to monitor ASI's activities at IDOC, [REDACTED] appeared amused. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not know where CRI would have gotten this idea. [REDACTED] said that while Thompson worked for CRI, [REDACTED] followed up with them "all the time." After Thompson went to work for ASI, nobody at CRI ever checked in with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] estimated that [REDACTED] had received about two telephone calls in the past year from CRI.
- s. When asked what [REDACTED] knew about Cindy Stegall (of ASI), [REDACTED] said that Stegall previously worked for IDOC in CIS quality assurance. [REDACTED] said that Stegall is "very

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sharp” and knows a lot about CIS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] found out that Patranabish hired Stegall because the ASI business was expanding. [REDACTED] did not believe that Stegall had any current relationships with any IDOC staff.

- t. In reference to the meeting that occurred on 1/6/2010, I asked [REDACTED] what steps were taken to ensure that the contractors complied with the requests made by IDOC [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] began to pay more attention to what the contractors were doing and that the Spector Pro software was installed on the contractors’ computers. [REDACTED] also passed the duty of reviewing the CRI billings to [REDACTED]
- u. At approximately 1:04 into the interview recording, [REDACTED] left the room to take a telephone call [REDACTED] returned to the interview room at approximately 1:06 and the interview was continued.
- v. [REDACTED] said that prior to August of 2009 [REDACTED]
- w. When asked why CRI was required to bill IDOC on an hourly basis instead of using a “fixed bid” method, [REDACTED] said that the fixed bid method could not be used with the two staff augmentation positions. [REDACTED] stated that once the contractors were taken off of the modularization project to work on the CIS implementation, the work on CIS could not be changed to a “deliverables” method of billing. [REDACTED] stated that the matters were further confused because IDOC staff was continuing to work on the same projects as the contractors and that it was very difficult to separate out who did what for billing purposes. When asked why, if it was a fixed bid, the modularization contractors were billing on an hourly basis prior to being reassigned to CIS, [REDACTED] said that it really did not matter because we are paying 1.2 million dollars regardless for the modularization. [REDACTED] said, “I protected ourselves by doing the fixed bid because I know how that works.”
- x. When asked how [REDACTED] knew that the contractors were meeting deliverables, [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] relied on the work-in-progress report. When asked if it ever seemed to [REDACTED] that the contractors were not making adequate progress, [REDACTED] said that all the staff missed deadlines. [REDACTED] believed this could be attributed to the changes in requirements and to the staff being new. [REDACTED] said the deadlines kept getting pushed out, but [REDACTED] did not know the reason for it and that the problems should have been reported back to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said, “Some of the things were no one’s fault. It was just, well we got into this and it got a lot more complicated.” [REDACTED] said that no one “raised their flag” and told him that the contractors were not doing their job. When asked if [REDACTED] was able to identify a period of time when the contractors’ progress slowed, [REDACTED] said that there was constant change all the time and nothing “red flagged” [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] relied on [REDACTED] to keep him informed of the progress through the work in progress report. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] would know all the details as to why the implementation was delayed. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was “not that close into it” and that [REDACTED] relied on [REDACTED] managers to keep [REDACTED] informed.

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- y. I provided [REDACTED] with a copy of a memo to [REDACTED] dated 2/17/10 and [REDACTED] confirmed his authorship (Attachment #2). [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was in a meeting on 2/16/2010 with [REDACTED] Patranabish and McCauley; and that this meeting was timed to occur simultaneously with the contractors' physical removal from the building. I provided [REDACTED] with a copy of an e-mail addressed to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] from Patranabish dated 2/16/2010 at 6:27 PM (Attachment #18). The e-mail contains an apology, a list of potential remedies and a list of programming accomplishments. When asked if [REDACTED] had been able to confirm Patranabish's claims regarding program progress, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] did not know. [REDACTED] stated that this is "technical stuff" and [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] had assigned some of [REDACTED] staff to verify Patranabish's claims.
- z. When asked if [REDACTED] knew the origin of the statement in [REDACTED] memo dated 2/18/2010 (Attachment #1) that "contractors have the agreement with Analyze Soft to work 8 hours for the IDOC and 2 hours after for ACOMS," [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was not aware of this. [REDACTED] said that his only concern was about the work performed for IDOC and [REDACTED] said, "I don't care what they do for Alaska."
- aa. [REDACTED] denied that the contractors had permission to use IDOC computer equipment for other jobs. [REDACTED] said that when the equipment was purchased, [REDACTED] selected laptops because there was the chance that the contractors would need to work from the ASI offices due to space constraints in the IDOC building. [REDACTED] believed that the contractors occasionally asked [REDACTED] for permission to take laptops off-site for their convenience in working on IDOC coding. [REDACTED] understanding was that the contractors were only supposed to be using the equipment for IDOC CIS programming.
- bb. [REDACTED] denied any personal relationship with Patranabish, but said that [REDACTED] does go out for drinks or for lunch with him. [REDACTED] described these occasions as business meetings to discuss NCOMS. [REDACTED] said that Patranabish has "done a lot" for IDOC and that it is not unusual for [REDACTED] to go out for drinks with vendors. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has never been to Patranabish's home nor has Patranabish been to [REDACTED] home. [REDACTED] then said, "well, the only time I went to his house is when we went down to Utah and that was approved and everything." [REDACTED] said that Patranabish approached [REDACTED] about having their [REDACTED] meet, but [REDACTED] thought this was inappropriate and did not agree to it. When asked if Patranabish had ever contributed to a golf tournament that [REDACTED] is involved with, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] did not. [REDACTED] denied playing golf with Patranabish. [REDACTED] then stated, "me and [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was here. We all went out to the driving range, and that's the only time that Arup ever... [REDACTED] invited him, it wasn't me."
- cc. When asked if [REDACTED] had any additional information to add, [REDACTED] said that Patranabish has been around IDOC for a long time and [REDACTED] has done a lot. [REDACTED] thought it was unfortunate that the events of the last year have occurred. When asked how bad [REDACTED] thought things had gotten with ASI's activities, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] purposely stayed out of the reviewing of the screen shots because [REDACTED] was concerned that people would accuse [REDACTED] of trying to skew the findings. [REDACTED] stated, "Heck if I'd tried to do that; I would have told them 'Hey, we put this software on your system.' I never told them that." [REDACTED] said that the more [REDACTED] has found out about it, the more upset and hurt [REDACTED] is by it. [REDACTED] said that

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█ trusted Patranabish and that █ believed that Patranabish knew what the contractors were doing. █ stated, "I had no reason to believe they were doing that because I never saw anything, no one ever brought anything to me." █ said that when █ showed him the screen shots of what the contractors were doing █ was shocked. █ said that when █ initially reported █ suspicions to █, █ thought that maybe the contractors were just doing some minor things █ could not believe it when █ saw the actual proof that they were coding. █ was especially upset about Saravanaperumal's activities because █ had been here longer than the rest of the contractors. █ went to █ and told █ what they had found on the screen shots. █ said that █ acted "shocked" by the information.

- dd. █ confirmed that May 11, 2010, would be his last day at IDOC. █ expressed █ desire to continue to cooperate and assist in the investigation even after █ exit date.
- ee. Interview concluded at approximately 3:40 PM.

31. On April 30, 2010, I received an e-mail from █ regarding an e-mail sent to █ by █ on 4/29/2010. █ stated in █ e-mail that, "This is what CRI is proposing and we will discuss tomorrow. It will be a Team Decision on how to proceed." Attached to █ e-mail was a resume for a CRI contractor Aaron Wells. Included at the bottom of █ e-mail was information regarding prospective fiscal employee █ (Attachment #19).
32. On May 3, 2010, a meeting was held in the IDOC third floor conference room to discuss the e-mail of 4/29/2010 forwarded to me by █ Present at this meeting were █ and myself. It was determined during this meeting that the use of contractors from CRI was not in the best interests of the investigation and that the hiring of █ (a recent ASI employee) was not appropriate.
33. On May 4, 2010, I received an e-mail from █ which stated, "Here is what I sent out to the IT managers. Again, making it a team decision and if you were to ask the managers, they knew that if we decided to go forward with CRI that "I" was talking with OPS first. As you can see from the e-mail, I was asking the IT leadership if they knew anything about █, since I did not and fiscal was asking me. In the meeting no one knew any particulars for sure. Fiscal was instructed on Friday not to hire. I was not going to bring the CRI offer to you if the team decided not to pursue. Also, as you see in the second to the last paragraph in my CRI meeting recap I sent to you on Apr.23rd, I mention this offer of part-time help with CRI. So my assumption is you had some visibility to this. Wanted to clarify that there is nothing covert going on and it is not █ or my intent to impede your investigation. If you have any further questions, please let me know. Thank you" (Attachment #19).

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34. On May 10, 2010, at approximately 1:04 PM, I interviewed IDOC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (IDOC staff [REDACTED]), in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit D), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

- a. [REDACTED] has worked for IDOC for about [REDACTED] and has spent that entire time in IT at central office. [REDACTED] primary responsibility is to conduct [REDACTED] [REDACTED] immediate supervisor is [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED] previously worked for about four to five months with another analyst, Cindy Stegall. [REDACTED] knew that Stegall is now employed by ASI [REDACTED] related an incident that occurred involving [REDACTED] and Stegall catching Patranabish and Saravanaperumal going through Stegall's desk drawers. Patranabish claimed that they were looking for a notebook, but [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not believe this because there were notebooks readily available without going through someone's desk [REDACTED] described Stegall as very upset and crying over this incident. [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] and told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] could not work around people who steal. [REDACTED] recalled that a meeting was held with [REDACTED] regarding this incident and that [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was very surprised to learn that Stegall was working for Patranabish.
- c. [REDACTED] had frequent, daily contact with all of the IT contractors. [REDACTED] recalled that at one time the only two contractors were "Arup and Chowdhry" (Patranabish and Saravanaperumal), but around the first of 2009, when the modularization project was started, about four or five others were brought in. [REDACTED] said that over the past two years, Patranabish has "swapped" people out from time to time when he needed them to work on other projects.
- d. When asked if [REDACTED] has found it challenging to learn IDOC business practices, [REDACTED] said that the software itself is quite easy to use, and [REDACTED] has not found it difficult to understand the [REDACTED] and has found [REDACTED] very easy to work with and very helpful. When asked about statements made to me by others that the program is "too complicated for anyone to understand," [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had been told by "Arup, [REDACTED] and Chowdhry" that the underlying computer code is "complicated and interwoven" and that it takes a long time to get things done. [REDACTED] did not believe these comments to be true because this has not been [REDACTED] experience in the past with computer programs.
- e. [REDACTED] observed the contractors working on non-IDOC projects on multiple occasions. [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] was the author of the e-mail sent to [REDACTED] on 3/3/2009, in which [REDACTED] reported observing Saravanaperumal with files for the state of Missouri open on his computer (see Attachment #4). [REDACTED] said that this was not the first time [REDACTED] observed or reported the behavior. [REDACTED] estimated reporting the behavior three to four times verbally, including during a project meeting prior to 3/3/2009. [REDACTED] did not receive any acknowledgement or response to [REDACTED] verbal and written reports. [REDACTED] stopped

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- j. When asked what [redacted] impression of Patranabish's relationship with IDOC management was, [redacted] stated, "I think he ran [redacted] [redacted] thought that [redacted] trusted Patranabish without question and believed everything he said. [redacted] stated that the contractors were favored and allowed more privileges than IDOC employees were. [redacted] cited their ability to work from home and their ability "to come and go as they pleased" as proof of this favoritism. [redacted] did not believe that [redacted] was being held accountable by [redacted] supervisor, [redacted] and, therefore, [redacted] was not holding [redacted] people" accountable. [redacted] speculated that [redacted] and [redacted] knew what the contractors were doing and were allowing it to continue. [redacted] also stated that [redacted] wondered if [redacted] might be receiving some personal benefit from [redacted] relationship with Patranabish because [redacted] could not believe "[redacted] is blind to that stuff. That they are just too stupid to see it."
- k. When asked if [redacted] observed the contractors removing equipment from the building, [redacted] said that they frequently took their laptops off site.
- l. When asked if [redacted] had ever observed any friction between the contractors and IDOC staff, [redacted] described several issues. [redacted] said that many of the IDOC staff resented the contractors because they had work taken away from them that was then given to the contractors. For example, [redacted] had been assigned to work on the PSI (Pre-sentence Investigation) piece of [redacted] [redacted] would be able to complete it more quickly. However, [redacted] said that the PSI module is still not complete [redacted] did not witness any actual threats made between the contractors and IDOC staff.
- m. [redacted] has never been provided with any additional specialized training by IDOC.
- n. [redacted] was never present in any meetings where the funding for CIS was discussed.
- o. When asked to describe [redacted] interaction with [redacted] [redacted] stated that [redacted] had favorites and that if you were [redacted]'s friend" [redacted] was almost too friendly [redacted] said that [redacted] targeted people that were not in the "good old boy club." [redacted] was aware that [redacted] had [redacted] [redacted] and believed that the staff were relieved by this.
- p. [redacted] related several issues regarding hostile work environment claims against [redacted] by [redacted] [redacted] did not believe [redacted] employee evaluation had been written by [redacted] supervisor, and thought that [redacted] had interjected [redacted] opinions into it. [redacted] wrote a rebuttal to [redacted] evaluation, but never heard anything more from HR. I recommended that [redacted] file a formal problem solving if [redacted] believed the information in the evaluation was inaccurate.
- q. [redacted] has had limited contact with [redacted] [redacted] but stated that [redacted] is not sure what [redacted] role is because [redacted] does not seem capable of correcting any of the problems in the IT area [redacted] stated that [redacted] does not trust [redacted] because nothing was ever done to hold [redacted] accountable.
- r. When asked how the environment has changed since the contractors were removed, [redacted] stated that it was a "happy feeling" because the staff programmers were tired of being belittled by the contractors [redacted] said that from a quality assurance perspective it was almost like the contractors had never been there. [redacted] believed that the IDOC staff

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had adjusted and were effectively “picking up the pieces.” [REDACTED] did not estimate that the pace of the CIS implementation was any slower than it had been when the contractors were here.

- s. I cautioned [REDACTED] to keep our interview confidential and to report any instances of potential intimidation or pressure regarding this investigation immediately.
- t. Interview concluded at approximately 2:00 PM.

35. On May 10, 2010, at approximately 2:04 PM, I interviewed IDOC IT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit C) [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

- a. [REDACTED] has worked for IDOC [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] supervises him. His work area [REDACTED]
- b. I presented [REDACTED] with a copy of a document dated 10/22/2009 addressed to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] confirmed [REDACTED] authorship (Attachment #5). This document describes [REDACTED] observation of the contractors engaged in non-IDOC business meetings and conference calls. I also presented [REDACTED] with a copy of an undated document that [REDACTED] allegedly provided to IDOC HR (Attachment #10). [REDACTED] identified the document and confirmed authorship. [REDACTED] agreed to provide information verifying the date this document was presented to human resources (Later confirmed via e-mail to have been submitted on 2/9/2010). This three-page statement contained a list of [REDACTED] concerns regarding the contracted IT staff and the work environment in IT (see Report Section #11). [REDACTED] stated that the only reason that anything had been done to stop the contractors’ activities was because [REDACTED] went over [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] heads. [REDACTED] believed that the management was protecting the contractors. When asked why [REDACTED] thought this, [REDACTED] stated that it was because nothing has really been done on CIS for years and the contractors were never held accountable. [REDACTED] said that at the same time [REDACTED] provided the statement to human resources, [REDACTED] sent a copy to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] never heard anything from [REDACTED] and was “very disheartened” by [REDACTED] lack of response to [REDACTED] concerns. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] has lost all confidence in his chain of command beyond [REDACTED]
- c. Patranabish was still working in the building when [REDACTED] came to work for IDOC and [REDACTED] became very familiar with him during that time. [REDACTED] described going on breaks with Patranabish and listening to him talk about his business dealings.
- d. [REDACTED] described an after-hours meeting in which [REDACTED] confronted Saravanaperumal about the contractors’ substandard performance on CIS. [REDACTED] said that Saravanaperumal was very evasive with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] was just doing what Patranabish told [REDACTED] to. [REDACTED] said that Saravanaperumal told [REDACTED] that they would probably both still be working on CIS when it was time for them to retire.

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- e. [REDACTED] had almost daily interaction with the contractors [REDACTED] described the contractors, specifically Vijayan and Saravanaperumal, as switching screens quickly when [REDACTED] entered their cubicles and [REDACTED] believed they were trying to hide what they were doing. [REDACTED] described frequently noting these two contractors logged on to the Mantis software. [REDACTED] also remembered seeing them on sports and news web sites.
- f. [REDACTED] did not believe the IDOC staff were treated as well as the contractors. [REDACTED] provided several examples. When one of the contractor's wives had a baby, the contractor was allowed to work from his home in New Jersey for an extended length of time. When IDOC staff member [REDACTED] had a baby, [REDACTED] was required to return to work with no consideration for working from home. [REDACTED] said that the contractors were provided with state computers to take home and that they were also given log-in access, which staff were not. [REDACTED] recalled seeing the contractors taking their laptops from the building on a regular basis.
- g. [REDACTED] described a meeting [REDACTED] was in with [REDACTED] and Patranabish regarding the offender identification card pictures. Patranabish told them that they did not have to worry about the coding for this function because they had already done this for Alaska and it would be available in a couple of days. [REDACTED] said that six months later [REDACTED] was in another meeting with [REDACTED] Saravanaperumal and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] asked about the availability of the Alaska code. [REDACTED] appeared not to remember anything about the initial meeting [REDACTED] said this was frustrating because it was another example of [REDACTED] not holding Patranabish accountable. [REDACTED] said that to his knowledge, the photo project in Alaska is still not complete.
- h. [REDACTED] has not received any additional training since coming to work for IDOC. [REDACTED] recalled three different meetings in which Patranabish discussed the "flow" of CIS. When [REDACTED] asked Patranabish about additional training, Patranabish told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] should be providing the training to other IDOC staff. This upset [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] is still considered a [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] wanted to learn instead of teaching.
- i. [REDACTED] has had limited interaction with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] recalled an incident that occurred when Patranabish was in his cubicle and [REDACTED] came looking for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] and Patranabish went just outside his cubicle and [REDACTED] heard [REDACTED] say, "Hey, we got it. \$1.2 million." [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] demeanor as "giddy." [REDACTED] understood [REDACTED] to be referring to the federal grant. [REDACTED] thought this was potentially inappropriate.
- j. [REDACTED] attended a meeting in which the shifting of resources from the modularization project to CIS was discussed. [REDACTED] was told that they had gotten permission from the grantor to make the change because it was essential for CIS to be finished before the work on the modularization could be done. [REDACTED] said this was "totally bogus" because [REDACTED] did not believe there was really any relationship between the two projects. [REDACTED] said it does not benefit NCOMS as a whole for one state to have complete and usable code because it still would not translate into the other states' system needs.
- k. [REDACTED] was not aware of any threats made by IDOC staff against the ASI contractors.

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- l. [REDACTED] identified a decrease in the contractors' productivity, but could not remember the time frame specifically.
 - m. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] trusted Patranabish too much. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not believe that [REDACTED] was a "good steward of tax payer money." [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] liked [REDACTED] personally [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not describe [REDACTED] as incompetent, but said that [REDACTED] "grew" that way because nobody was holding [REDACTED] accountable.
 - n. [REDACTED] expressed frustration over reporting his concerns to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and never receiving any feedback from them. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] previous verbal reports were not taken seriously, and that they just believed whatever [REDACTED] told them without questioning it. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] is a good manager, but does not trust anyone in upper management. [REDACTED] voiced concerns over being punished for cooperating with the investigation and for bringing potential wrongdoing forward to management.
 - o. When asked how things have changed since the contractors were removed from the building, [REDACTED] said that they are better and [REDACTED] estimated that the IT staff is producing just as good a product as the contractors were. [REDACTED] did not think that the work on CIS had slowed appreciably due to the departure of the contractors, but thought that any slowing of the pace of CIS progress was due to upper management decisions to assign staff programmers to other tasks.
 - p. [REDACTED] said that when the contractors were removed from IDOC, [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and told [REDACTED] what had happened. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] would welcome the opportunity to provide information for this investigation.
 - q. During the interview, [REDACTED] provided a document unrelated to this investigation regarding purchasing decisions made in IT in respect to the use of PREA grant funds. (See OPS investigation 10-014 for additional information regarding this matter.)
 - r. Interview concluded at approximately 3:47 PM.
36. On May 11, 2010, at approximately 1:06 PM, I interviewed IDOC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (IDOC staff [REDACTED]), in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit C), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:
- a. [REDACTED] came to work for IDOC [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] job responsibilities include [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] immediate supervisor was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] directly supervises [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] previously supervised [REDACTED].
 - b. [REDACTED] office on the [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] interacted with the contractors frequently in an attempt to speed up their coding work. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] needed to "stay on top of them a lot." [REDACTED] found the pace of their production to be unusually slow in [REDACTED] of experience in working with

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- h. [REDACTED] was not aware of any type of training that was provided to IDOC staff either formally or by ASI contractors. [REDACTED] did recall Patranabish conducting a brief overview, but did not think it was of great value to the staff.
- i. [REDACTED] frequently saw the contractors taking laptop computers from the IDOC building.
- j. [REDACTED] was present during a meeting in which [REDACTED] openly discussed funding plans for CIS with Patranabish in attendance, and told them the amount of funds they had to spend. [REDACTED] thought this was inappropriate since Patranabish was a contractor.
- k. [REDACTED] stated that staff were resentful of the contractors' ability to work off-site when IDOC staff were not afforded this consideration. [REDACTED] stated that there were times when the whole team would be out of the building for meetings at the ASI offices or involved in conference calls concerning others states. [REDACTED] believed that it was wrong for them to conduct ASI business on IDOC time using IDOC equipment. They continued to do this even after they were asked not to. [REDACTED] did not believe there was any follow-up to make sure they ceased the behavior. [REDACTED] believed that Patranabish "pretty much ran the show" and that [REDACTED] just did whatever Patranabish asked him to.
- l. [REDACTED] was shocked when [REDACTED] during a recent meeting, suggested bringing in a couple of other contractors. [REDACTED] described this as being presented very positively, as if it was a great idea and that one of the individuals had experience working on CIS in Alaska. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] "smelled a rat," and thought the idea of bringing someone in was completely inappropriate because [REDACTED] believed this person ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) worked for ASI. [REDACTED] also told them that CRI was going to provide someone for free and told them how great that was. When [REDACTED] questioned [REDACTED] wisdom in bringing these people in, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had already "cleared" it through OPS. [REDACTED] still thought it was a bad idea, but said that if everyone knew and the decision was made, [REDACTED] would accept it because "I'm just a peon." [REDACTED] never heard any more about these two people coming to work.
- m. When asked how things have changed in IT since the departure of the contractors, [REDACTED] said that the mood of the staff has improved. [REDACTED] did not see the contractors leaving as a setback to production since "they weren't working for us anyway."
- n. [REDACTED] was not aware of any overt threats between the contractors and IDOC staff. [REDACTED] recalled that Chowdhry (Saravanaperumal) and [REDACTED] had some disagreements about coding decisions.
- o. [REDACTED] expressed concern over being punished for [REDACTED] cooperation during the interview. [REDACTED] described a situation in which [REDACTED] "went to bat" for one of [REDACTED] employees, and that [REDACTED] was ultimately punished for it. [REDACTED] again mentioned the Performance Improvement Plan and said that [REDACTED] has been on the plan for months with no clear expectations. [REDACTED] meets regularly with [REDACTED] but does not see any actual follow-up occurring. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] it was not a "normal" Performance Improvement Plan and [REDACTED] took this as a threat that [REDACTED] could do anything [REDACTED] wanted to and did not have to follow the IDOC policies. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had "shut down" because things had gotten so bad in the IT area and [REDACTED] was just trying to "keep [REDACTED] head down and do [REDACTED] work." [REDACTED] was concerned that if [REDACTED] read this report and got "pissed off

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- d. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] frustrations regarding the setting of reasonable timelines for the completion of specific work. [REDACTED] said that the time estimates provided by Patranabish did not produce any incentive for the contractors to complete their work in a timelier manner. [REDACTED] said it was difficult to hold the contractors accountable for what they were doing because no one on the IDOC staff was directly involved in the programming work on CIS. [REDACTED] believed this shifted the balance of power to the contractors and that they were basically running everything with no input from staff. [REDACTED] was uncomfortable with this because management always sided with the contractors whenever there was a question about how something should be done. [REDACTED] understood that the contractors were supposed to be the “experts,” but believed that IDOC was relying on them too much. [REDACTED] did not think they were as experienced or as capable as [REDACTED] was initially led to believe. [REDACTED] said that IDOC staff has uncovered “any number” of coding errors since the contractors were removed, and said that they had “made a mess” of things.
- e. [REDACTED] said that there appeared to be some effort on the part of Patranabish and the contractors to prevent IDOC staff from becoming too involved in CIS. When asked what advantage this would be, [REDACTED] stated that if ASI controlled the code and the data, they could manipulate it in any way that suited them, and IDOC would not be able to detect it. [REDACTED] offered a technical example of how this had been done, but stated that [REDACTED] had no proof whether this was intentional. [REDACTED] said that the only reason that IDOC became aware of this activity by the contractors was because the coding function was so poorly performed that it bounced back as an error. (This example was referenced in an e-mail received from [REDACTED] on 5/11/2010 as a forward from [REDACTED] – see Attachment #15.)
- f. [REDACTED] was not present in any meetings where the source of CIS funding was specifically discussed, but stated that the amount of the remaining funds for the project was “widely known.” [REDACTED] presented a four-page document on ASI stationary dated 1/14/2010 entitled “CIS 2.0 Modularization Project Status and Updated Project Plan” and attributed the authorship to Patranabish. The document includes a module dependency diagram, a percentage of project-completed table, and a table estimating the hours required to complete the modules. [REDACTED] found it odd that the estimated hours very nearly equaled the remaining grant funds amount. When asked if [REDACTED] had a way of determining whether the percentage of completed work was accurate, [REDACTED] said that there was really no way to determine that since the contractors did not produce any documentation of what they had been doing. After receipt of this document, [REDACTED] asked ASI for more specific information regarding their progress. In response to this request, [REDACTED] received a five-page document on ASI stationary dated 2/11/2010 entitled “OMP and CORE Module Status Document Version 1.0.” This document is a collection of tables that indicate the section of the module, a description of the tasks completed and a description of the tasks remaining. [REDACTED] stated that one of [REDACTED] staff members tried to open the modularization project to check the accuracy, but was unsuccessful. [REDACTED] said

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that more time and effort would need to be devoted to validating the contents of the report.

- g. [REDACTED] recalled that some time in September 2009 staff members began coming to [REDACTED] with complaints about the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. Over the following month, [REDACTED] received several additional complaints regarding improper telephone calls and meetings. Rather than reporting this to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] e-mailed Patranabish directly and requested that the contractors cease these activities while on IDOC time. [REDACTED] said because of the preferential way that [REDACTED] treated the contractors, [REDACTED] did not “feel safe” going to [REDACTED] with complaints about them. [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] would “sweep it under the rug.” [REDACTED] observed contractor Vijayan with ACOMS work displayed on his monitor. Because of [REDACTED] suspicions about the ACOMS work, [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] counterpart in Alaska, Don Brand, via e-mail on 12/27/2009, and inquired who the main contractors were on Alaska’s project. Brand identified “Chowdhry (Saravanaperumal) and Ramesh (Krishnan)” as two of the contractors working on ACOMS in his e-mail response of 12/28/2009. When [REDACTED] received this response, [REDACTED] brought [REDACTED] concerns directly to [REDACTED] Investigator [REDACTED] who told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] needed to report this to [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED] reported to [REDACTED] he asked [REDACTED] to take [REDACTED] concerns to [REDACTED] which [REDACTED] did. [REDACTED] believed that if [REDACTED] had not gone around [REDACTED] to report these issues, that [REDACTED] would have ignored the problem, but because others already knew [REDACTED] was forced to take [REDACTED] seriously. When asked how [REDACTED] reacted to [REDACTED] report, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] continued to minimize the importance of the issues with the contractors until [REDACTED] saw the actual screen shots. (See Attachment #1 e-mails between [REDACTED] and Brand.)
- h. [REDACTED] was aware of the decision to install the Spector Pro software on the contractors’ computers and believed this was done sometime in December 2009. [REDACTED] said that a delay occurred in monitoring the screen shots collected by the program because the staff member that installed the software [REDACTED], was out of the building for medical reasons. Once [REDACTED] had access to the screen shots; [REDACTED] found that multiple contractors were working on ACOMS during the regular IDOC workday. [REDACTED] said that during the review of Saravanaperumal’s laptop [REDACTED] noted “blatant” use of ACOMS and determined that this was the clearest example to demonstrate to [REDACTED] the depth of the contractors’ activities and [REDACTED] presented this information to [REDACTED]. When asked about [REDACTED] reaction, [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] appeared “stunned.” [REDACTED] believed this was a genuine reaction and that [REDACTED] was “blindsided” by the fact that Patranabish would condone this.
- i. [REDACTED] confirmed that there were limited screen shots for two of the contractors. One of the contractors, Vijayakumar Kanmanthareddy, apparently noticed that his computer was running slowly with the keylogging software installed on it and reinstalled the operating system back to a time previous to the installation of Spector Pro. [REDACTED] did not believe that he was aware of Spector Pro, but was trying to maximize the computer’s efficiency. The second contractor, Saravanaperumal, was working regularly on more than one computer, and the software was not installed on his desktop, but only on his laptops. This resulted in a limited number of screen shots being collected.

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- j. In reference to the meeting held on 1/6/2010 with Patranabish and Platt Thompson from ASI and [REDACTED] and from IDOC, [REDACTED] confirmed that the issues of excessive phone use, and the accessing non-IDOC web sites by the contractors were addressed. [REDACTED] said that during this meeting Patranabish told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] just did not understand why the contractors needed to be on non-IDOC web sites. Patranabish said that the contractors were going to other web sites to find “fixes” for Idaho problems. He offered to provide [REDACTED] with a list of all the coding fixes from Alaska that had been used in Idaho. When [REDACTED] asked for examples of the fixes, Patranabish mentioned “photos.” [REDACTED] said that the contractors were not assigned to the photo project and therefore did not find Patranabish’s example relevant. (See Attachment #1 1/6/2010 meeting summary.)
- k. Sometime shortly after the 1/6/2010 meeting, [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to start monitoring the contractors’ hours and checking the invoices from CRI. When asked if this was [REDACTED] idea or [REDACTED] [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] “pushed it” with [REDACTED] and was given the task, but could not remember exactly how this occurred.
- l. [REDACTED] said that there were a number of discussions about what needed to be done about the contractors and it was eventually determined that they needed to be removed from the building. [REDACTED] was not part of this decision, but was tasked with the actual removal of the contractors on 2/16/2010. [REDACTED] said that the original intention was to remove the contractors from the building for one day so that the Spector Pro software could be reinstalled and checked to improve the security. [REDACTED] gathered the contractors together and read them a prepared statement, took their access and identity cards, allowed them to collect their personal belongings and walked them out of the building. [REDACTED] later learned that the contractors would not be returning.
- m. When asked about the preferential treatment of the contractors, [REDACTED] said that they were allowed to work from home and the IDOC staff were not. [REDACTED] believed this issue had been taken directly to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] described a level of inequality between the way the contractors and the staff were treated that resulted in resentment toward the contractors. [REDACTED] frequently saw the contractors leaving the building with computer equipment and thought this was a daily occurrence.
- n. When asked if, as a supervisor, [REDACTED] was aware of any training plan for IT staff; [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was initially told that Patranabish was going to provide training to IDOC staff on CIS and JAVA. However, the only training [REDACTED] was aware of that Patranabish provided was when he came in “with a book” and told them how things were laid out and how to find certain files. [REDACTED] said that at some point Patranabish seemed to have a theory that a person learned best by teaching so he assigned the two newest staff members the task of presenting information to the IT group. [REDACTED] did not agree with this theory. [REDACTED] identified [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as the two staff members. [REDACTED] recalled asking Patranabish for a list of suggested reading/reference material for [REDACTED] staff, but he never provided anything. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] several times about providing formal JAVA training for the staff, but did not receive any support for this.
- o. When asked what [REDACTED] thought about [REDACTED] leaving the department, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] thought it was probably a good thing. [REDACTED] said that as a [REDACTED], [REDACTED] had

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favorites, that [REDACTED] could be vindictive and that [REDACTED] lied constantly. When asked to provide an example of [REDACTED] untruthfulness, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] lied so much it was hard to keep track of it. [REDACTED] did provide the following examples: [REDACTED] said that sometime in October 2009 [REDACTED] lied about what the Spector Pro program actually was when the manager questioned [REDACTED] about their right to install it on IDOC staff computers. [REDACTED] expressed particular concern about passwords and other sensitive information being made available through viewing of screen shots. [REDACTED] told them that Spector Pro was not a "keylogger" and did not have that functionality. Later, when [REDACTED] began to review the contractor screen shots it became clear to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had lied about the software. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] lied to them to "back up" [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] recalled a meeting [REDACTED] attended with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in which [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] had taken care of something. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had and then turned to [REDACTED] for confirmation. [REDACTED] knew that [REDACTED] was lying, but felt very uncomfortable about disagreeing with [REDACTED] in front of [REDACTED] bosses. When asked what [REDACTED] lied about in this circumstance, [REDACTED] said that it was something trivial and that was one of the reasons why [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] lied out of habit. [REDACTED] provided various other examples of the demoralizing effects of [REDACTED] management style and [REDACTED] demonstration of favoritism towards certain staff members. [REDACTED] hoped that [REDACTED] departure might signal a positive change in the IT department, but [REDACTED] is now concerned because [REDACTED] has recently "had [REDACTED] [REDACTED] lie to me about a couple of things."

- p. [REDACTED] said that after the 1/6/2010 meeting, David McCauley from ASI began coming into the building and working with the contractors for the purpose of proving to [REDACTED] that they were using Alaska code to fix Idaho issues. [REDACTED] described this process as furtive and believed that there was an attempt to further hide their activities. [REDACTED] stated that they tried to pretend like they had never accessed Alaska code from IDOC before and [REDACTED] appeared disgusted by the play-acting that occurred between Saravanaperumal and McCauley. [REDACTED] provided me with a two-page undated document and stated that McCauley gave it to [REDACTED] as an example of Idaho bugs that were fixed with Alaska code. The two topic areas were Parole Commission and Sentencing. When asked if [REDACTED] had been able to determine if these two examples were legitimate, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had not confirmed this, but guessed that they were probably correct.
- q. Referencing [REDACTED] e-mail to me on 4/30/2010 regarding CRI's proposal to provide a contract programmer, [REDACTED] described the meeting that took place regarding this matter. [REDACTED] said that present at this meeting were [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that when they reviewed the resume of [REDACTED] the description "made [REDACTED] cringe" because of his connection with the Alaska DOC. [REDACTED] did not identify ASI as his employer on the paperwork. When asked how this information had been presented to them, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] impression was that [REDACTED] really wanted to hire [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] talked about what an asset [REDACTED] would be in the area of inmate banking, stating that he had many great skills. Concerning the CRI contractor, [REDACTED] told them that they had met with CRI and that CRI felt bad about the

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way things had turned out and were just trying to make it up to IDOC. [REDACTED] got the impression that it had already been decided to bring the CRI person in because of the way it was presented. [REDACTED] was “freaked out” by the proposal of bringing in people from CRI and ASI during an active investigation. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] stated to them that [REDACTED] had already e-mailed OPS and that if the team decided to hire either person, [REDACTED] would inform OPS about it. Neither of these people was brought in and [REDACTED] never heard anything further from [REDACTED] about this. (See Report Section #31.)

- r. [REDACTED] expressed concern over [REDACTED] NCOMS activities, stating that when the resources were shifted from the modularization project to IDOC CIS, [REDACTED] did not inform the consortium. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] suggested several times that NCOMS needed to be told, but [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that if they asked questions about the NCOMS project’s progress, [REDACTED] should refer them to him. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] what information had been shared with NCOMS about the shifting of resources and about the current investigation. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had not told them anything about either issue. When [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] for guidance concerning this, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] to check with OPS or IDOC legal about the investigation before [REDACTED] provided any information to NCOMS. [REDACTED] still does not know how to answer questions concerning the shifting of the resources from NCOMS modularization to IDOC CIS.

- s. [REDACTED] believed that the contractors’ activities in working for other states had escalated due to discussions in the NCOMS group about moving toward a non-profit status. Don Brand of Alaska became the chairman of NCOMS after [REDACTED] stepped down and [REDACTED] believed that Patranabish was going to “follow the money;” and that he was prioritizing Alaska’s work over IDOC’s. [REDACTED] believed this shift occurred in September of 2009.
- t. Interview concluded at approximately 4:50 PM.

38. On May 12, 2010, at approximately 9:30 AM, I interviewed [REDACTED] in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit D), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

- a. [REDACTED] came to work for IDOC in [REDACTED]. During his time at IDOC [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED] recalled that the CIS conversion process started approximately ten years ago. He explained that the code obtained from Utah was written in the computer language “PowerBuilder.” [REDACTED] said that initially the system ran well. [REDACTED] said that there was a consortium of states that wanted to create a code base that could be shared and determined that JAVA would be the best computer language to use. IBM was contracted to rewrite the PowerBuilder language into JAVA, but there were problems with this

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because the code was "wrapped around" the informix database. Later, Patranabish was hired because of the necessity of tailoring the converted program to make it Idaho-specific. At the time this occurred, JAVA programmers were hard to find so they really needed someone with the expertise to assist with the program. ██████ believed that part of the intention in hiring a contractor with JAVA experience was to assist IDOC staff in learning JAVA and how to work on the CIS program ██████ said that did not happen and no training was ever provided. ██████ recalled being sent to one class, but stated that the skills gained in the training were never utilized so they were not retained. ██████ said that the IDOC staff were tasked with performing conversions and with maintaining the prior computer system, Reflections, and that they were not involved in the CIS development.

- c. ██████ was never in close working contact with the contractors prior to his retirement, they were working on the bank-side of the IDOC building. ██████ had no knowledge of the contractors working on non-IDOC projects.
- d. When asked about ██████ contact with Patranabish, ██████ said that ██████ would tell ██████ "anything ██████ wanted to hear." ██████ believed that Patranabish was more interested in developing business with other states in the consortium than in working on the IDOC project. ██████ recalled having periodic disagreements with Patranabish, but nothing really serious. When asked his opinion of Patranabish's computer skills, ██████ said that ██████ was "well versed" in JAVA. ██████ believed that Patranabish sometimes made things sound "rosier than they were" because he wanted to keep ██████ happy.
- e. When asked what ██████ thought about the progress of CIS, ██████ said that ██████ did not understand some of the initial decisions that were made about the program. ██████ described an "inefficient" process that was driven by the quality assurance people requesting things from the programmers based on end user requests. ██████ believed that this was very frustrating to the contract programmers. ██████ blamed these problems on poor communication and lack of project management. ██████ said that prior to ██████ ██████ ██████ departure, ██████ Patranabish and ██████ ran everything. ██████ thought that Patranabish was hired by IDOC on ██████ recommendation.
- f. When asked what ██████ thought of the statement, "CIS is so complicated that nobody can understand it," ██████ said, "it isn't that bad." ██████ said that it was complicated because of the level of integration in the system. ██████ stated that early on, an attempt was made to create a generic program and it did not fit with Idaho's way of doing business. ██████ said that one of his main complaints was that ██████ designed the program and it was "█████ baby." He said that ██████ did not share any of the information with anyone but Patranabish about the underlying design and tried to do everything ██████ without input from IDOC staff. ██████ believed that the management of the project was too centralized and ██████ was a "control freak." ██████ performed the entire program testing ██████ and ██████ was sure that ██████ missed a lot of things that should have been corrected. ██████ believed that ██████ was responsible for the delays in CIS because ██████ was the one that had the most control over who worked on what and whether things were getting accomplished. ██████ said the IDOC staff felt like they were just bystanders in the process. ██████ was concerned

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that IDOC staff were going to be expected to pick up the maintenance of CIS once the contractors left, but they were not provided with any of the tools to do so.

- g. [REDACTED] was disturbed that none of the computer programming work was being bid out and that Patranabish was being given all the CIS work. [REDACTED] said that IBM was capable of providing the same or better service, but they were never considered again.
- h. [REDACTED] said that there was a mass exodus of IT staff because of the working environment created by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that part of the frustration with [REDACTED] was the negative tone of the employee evaluations that [REDACTED] prepared. [REDACTED] said that it was never mentioned what you did right, it was always about what you did wrong. There was never any coaching or counseling provided to help employees improve. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had favorites and that everything was fine as long as [REDACTED] liked you. [REDACTED] listed a number of employees that [REDACTED] alleged [REDACTED] had "run off." [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] tried to talk to [REDACTED] about it, but nothing ever changed. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] cited [REDACTED] negative attitude as part of the problem.
- i. [REDACTED] has several friends in the IT department at IDOC, and [REDACTED] agreed not to discuss our interview with them.
- j. Interview concluded at approximately 10:24 AM.

39. On May 12, 2010, at approximately 11:10 AM, I interviewed IDOC [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] office at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit C), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

- a. [REDACTED] has been employed by IDOC for approximately [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has spent [REDACTED] entire career in the [REDACTED].
However, [REDACTED] experience with the CIS system goes back to the original introduction of the "Utah system" because [REDACTED] has been a "super-user" since that time. [REDACTED] immediate supervisor is [REDACTED].
- b. As subject matter expert, [REDACTED] performed various functions during the implementation. For example, [REDACTED] provided education on CIS to the districts and at the academy, [REDACTED] wrote user guides, [REDACTED] analyzed and identified business requirements, [REDACTED] tested the CIS database system for functionality and suggested changes and improvements. [REDACTED] works closely with IT [REDACTED].
- c. [REDACTED] described the CIS implementation project as "frustrating on so many levels." [REDACTED] has frequently been given deadlines to produce requirements, only to learn that the programming cannot move forward due to other issues. [REDACTED] said, "it's a hurry up, hurry up, hurry up, do this, do this, do this, but oh by the way, we're not going to implement it for nine months." [REDACTED] believed there was a basic lack of understanding of the underlying program. [REDACTED] described various phases of the project from inception, and stated that no actual architectural information was ever provided either by Utah or any of the

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developers that have worked on the system. ■ stated that there was a remarkable lack of documentation of what had been done during the life of the project. ■ said that it continues to be a problem because some of the coding strings have been changed to match Idaho nomenclature, but other parts of the coding still have the original Utah nomenclature and it ends up “breaking” the system.

- d. When asked who ■ thought was responsible for the problems with CIS, ■ stated that whoever originally brought the Utah system to Idaho should have ensured that all the relevant documentation came with it. ■ said that the contractors made changes to the code without realizing the impact of their actions, and a lot of time has been spent fixing problems that they actually created by not having proper knowledge of the architecture.
- e. When asked if ■ believed the statement that, “CIS is so complicated that nobody can understand it,” ■ said that the system is complicated because it has not been managed properly. ■ stated that former ■ was responsible for a lot of the poor decisions that were made, and that ■ refused to accept suggestions from anyone regarding the underlying differences between Utah and Idaho’s business requirements. ■ believed that because ■ did not know or understand anything about how a correctional system works, ■ (■ was unable to determine what the net effects of ■ decisions would be. ■ thought the environment that resulted from ■ behavior “set up this project for a level of failure.”
- f. ■ believed that ■ did not exercise enough oversight in monitoring the project. ■ said that it was clear to ■ that ■ was not keeping track of anything that was being done or what the actual progress of the project was. ■ said that ■ provided unrealistic timelines to the IDOC management even when ■ knew that IT was not going to meet the deadlines. ■ believed that ■ was just telling people what was expedient at the time without regard to reality. ■ recalled that ■ invited ■ and ■ to an NCOMS meeting, but that this only occurred once. ■ believed that they were never invited back because ■ “didn’t shine” during the meeting because he did not know as much about CIS as ■ and ■ did.
- g. ■ did not have frequent contact with the contractors because ■ had been told not to talk to them directly. ■ described a variety of problems created by the lack of communication that resulted from this directive, such as needlessly reprogramming code due to misunderstandings about the business requirements.
- h. ■ did not observe the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. ■ work area has never been close to where the contractors were working. ■ recalled seeing a social networking site displayed on one contractor’s monitor. ■ was not aware of the contractors’ use of IDOC equipment.
- i. ■ knew that Patranabish’s company was awarded the Alaska contract, but assumed this meant that he had people working on it at the ASI office.
- j. ■ was told that the IDOC program development staff were incapable of working on CIS because they did not know the correct code language; and that all major projects would go to the contractors. ■ did not believe the contractors were actually very capable because of the number of failures that occurred.

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- k. [REDACTED] noticed a lot of movement of tasks in the SourceForge software and believed this was done to create the illusion of activity rather than actually documenting legitimate work. [REDACTED] referred to this as a “shell game.”
- l. [REDACTED] did not witness any incidents of threats or friction between the IDOC staff and the contractors.
- m. [REDACTED] said that a litany of excuses have been provided regarding the delay of the CIS implementation. For example, [REDACTED] said that when we were not fully staffed, then that was the excuse why things were not moving forward. When we were fully staffed, then the excuse was that people were too new and inexperienced. [REDACTED] was not aware of any efforts made to educate the IDOC staff in any programming languages.
- n. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] verbally reported [REDACTED] concerns regarding CIS in the IT project meetings that [REDACTED] attended. [REDACTED] never met directly with [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] was not in [REDACTED] chain of command. [REDACTED] frequently reported [REDACTED] concerns about CIS to [REDACTED] for the purpose of keeping [REDACTED] informed.
- o. When asked how things have changed since the removal of the contractors, [REDACTED] said that the IDOC staff seem much more relaxed and happy. [REDACTED] believed that the production of work has actually increased.
- p. When asked if [REDACTED] would be surprised that [REDACTED] had blamed the delay of CIS on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said, “No, we expected that.” Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] kept their supervisors fully informed of CIS problems because they suspected that [REDACTED] was going to try to use them as “scapegoats.” [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] would never give them a direct answer to any questions [REDACTED] was asked about the CIS delays. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also reported their concerns directly to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] described their response as “guarded.” [REDACTED] did not feel they had gotten any useful feedback from this meeting. This was the only time that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
- q. [REDACTED] provided several examples of technical problems within the system such as the “environments” not being in sync with each other. [REDACTED] said that a module might test fine in the development and test environments, but when it was deployed to the production environment it “tanked and took everything else down with it.” [REDACTED] stated that this happened on several occasions, but nothing was ever done to address the underlying problems.
- r. [REDACTED] has kept a number of relevant documents, meeting minutes, notes and other historical information regarding the CIS project. Sometime in 2008 [REDACTED] created a “mapping” document of the underlying CIS program, for the purposes of tracking program changes. [REDACTED] said that some of the developers and former [REDACTED] [REDACTED] referred to this document periodically and that others in IT have also used it. [REDACTED] expressed a great deal of frustration about the lack of commitment to documenting the programmatic changes that were made.
- s. Interview concluded at approximately 12:41 PM.

40. On May 12, 2010, at approximately 1:08 PM, I interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (IDOC staff [REDACTED]), in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110,

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- ██████████ said that it took about a year to realize what was actually going on with the CIS project. When asked if ██████████ ever took his concerns to management, ██████████ said that ██████████ did take his issues to ██████████. ██████████ said that ██████████ minimized his complaints and told ██████████ that ██████████ (██████████) was not an applications developer so ██████████ could not understand what was really going on. ██████████ did not believe that ██████████ was unethical as much as ██████████ was incompetent. ██████████ also described ██████████ as “vengeful” and stated that once you got on ██████████ bad side you knew it pretty quickly.
- d. When asked if ██████████ believed the statements made by others that the “CIS system was too difficult for anyone to understand,” ██████████ said that that might be an accurate statement from the perspective that it was an “over complicated” system. ██████████ explained that the basic theory behind converting the program was flawed because of the structure of the original system. ██████████ said that there was an underlying assumption on ██████████ part that all corrections systems worked the same way and that ██████████ refused to accept any evidence to the contrary. ██████████ said this caused a wealth of problems in working with the business requirements. ██████████ believed that implementation of CIS should have been accomplished within two years instead of still on-going at year seven. When asked if IDOC staff had the ability to validate the contractors’ progress in CIS, ██████████ said “no” because none of the staff had adequate JAVA skills.
 - e. ██████████ did not see Patranabish or Saravanaperumal working on any non-IDOC projects, but suspected that this was happening. ██████████ based his suspicions on Patranabish’s behavior at the two NCOMS meetings that ██████████ attended. ██████████ said that Patranabish seemed to be attempting to solicit business from other NCOMS states, specifically the state of Alaska, and referred to it as the classic “fox in the hen house” scenario. Patranabish told ██████████ sometime later that ██████████ had gotten a contract with Alaska.
 - f. ██████████ was aware of friction between the IDOC staff and Patranabish and Saravanaperumal over CIS. ██████████ described Patranabish as defensive whenever ██████████ was questioned about anything, and stated that ██████████ had a “trigger” temper. ██████████ never heard any threats actually voiced.
 - g. In reference to the computer equipment used by the contractors, ██████████ said that ██████████ could not understand why IDOC provided them with state-of-the art equipment. ██████████ stated that as a consultant, ██████████ was always expected to provide his own equipment.
 - h. When asked about his interaction with ██████████, ██████████ said that ██████████ had an open-door policy and that ██████████ talked to ██████████ about some things. ██████████ never discussed ██████████ with ██████████ because it was “not a good career move.” ██████████ never reported his underlying concerns about CIS to ██████████ or ██████████. The only discussions ██████████ had with them were regarding the deadlines for the project.
 - i. ██████████ was aware that the modularization project was funded through a federal grant and was present when the grant application was being developed. ██████████ said that ██████████ thought it was “bizarre” that Patranabish was in the room during some of the meetings regarding the grant application.

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- j. [REDACTED] said that during his tenure as [REDACTED] tried to put more formal processes in place. For example, [REDACTED] tried to institute program “change control” documentation because there were no tracking mechanisms. [REDACTED] later attempted to put together a plan for the modularization project, but found it difficult because of the underlying system structure. [REDACTED] was responsible for introducing SourceForge as a tracking mechanism sometime in 2008.
- k. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] shared his issues concerning [REDACTED] with IDOC HR during his exit interview.
- l. Interview concluded at approximately 1:51 PM.

41. On May 17, 2010, at approximately 9:55 AM, I interviewed IDOC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (IDOC staff # [REDACTED] in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit C), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

- a. [REDACTED] has been employed by IDOC since [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is his immediate supervisor.
- b. [REDACTED] had direct contact with the contractors regarding the business requirements for CIS. [REDACTED] said that initially just Patranabish and Saravanaperumal were working on CIS, but when the modularization project began, more contractors were hired. Most of [REDACTED] contact was with Saravanaperumal. [REDACTED] noticed a change over time in the contractors’ responsiveness to requests for changes and corrections to CIS. [REDACTED] said that at first everyone was very helpful, however, sometime in the summer of 2009 [REDACTED] noticed that they were not as quick to correct problems or respond to issues. [REDACTED] believed that they were working on other projects because some of the IT managers mentioned their concerns about this to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said the managers were unhappy about the fact that nothing had been done after they reported their concerns about the contractors to IDOC management.
- c. [REDACTED] never observed the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. [REDACTED] physical work area was [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED] had some contact with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] during weekly CIS meetings. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had oversight of the project, but was not directly involved in it. At some point around the first of the year, the weekly meetings were discontinued without explanation.
- e. [REDACTED] was not aware of any friction between the contractors and IDOC staff.
- f. [REDACTED] never observed the contractors leaving the IDOC building with computer equipment.
- g. [REDACTED] believed that the modularization project was funded under a federal grant, but was not aware of any of the other funding sources for CIS.
- h. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] does not believe the pace of the CIS implementation has been slowed significantly by the departure of the contractors. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had not observed very

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- much productivity from them in the last months they were here. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] now works a lot more directly with the staff programmers than [REDACTED] did with the contractors.
- i. When asked how [REDACTED] felt about the CIS project overall, [REDACTED] said that it has been incredibly slow and poorly managed. [REDACTED] said there were initially a lot of problems with the previous [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as difficult to work with because [REDACTED] would not listen to alternative solutions, but insisted on having things “ [REDACTED] way.” [REDACTED] said that in two and one-half years, IT has never met a single deadline. [REDACTED] stated that nobody has ever been held accountable for the missed deadlines, but the delays were always explained away as, “it was harder than we thought.” [REDACTED] said that things got a lot better for him once [REDACTED] gave up hope.
 - j. When asked if [REDACTED] would be surprised to know that [REDACTED] blamed the CIS implementation problems on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said, “not at all.” [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] was looking for excuses anywhere. [REDACTED] claimed that the conversion from the old system to CIS was delayed because [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had not provided the necessary requirements. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] even changed [REDACTED] work area so tha [REDACTED] was more visible to his supervisor because [REDACTED] asserted that [REDACTED] was not available to the IT team. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] took [REDACTED] concerns about [REDACTED] assertions directly to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was not going to be the “scapegoat” for the delays. [REDACTED] also informed [REDACTED] supervisor, [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] concerns. [REDACTED] said that sometime previous to this, [REDACTED] told him that [REDACTED] needed to be more accessible because [REDACTED] input was vital. [REDACTED] also staffed this conversation with [REDACTED] supervisor. [REDACTED] described issues that sometimes developed when policies were changed that affected the actual requirements, but stated that there should not have been any other issues because [REDACTED] turned in all his required information.
 - k. [REDACTED] became aware that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had checked with Alaska and learned that one of the key contractors for their project was an individual that was working at IDOC full time. [REDACTED] reported this to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] had taken the information to the leadership team.
 - l. [REDACTED] said that the information [REDACTED] had gained regarding the contractors potential wrongdoing had come from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has not discussed the investigation with anyone.
 - m. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] believes the problems with the CIS project are a “management issue.” [REDACTED] identified [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as having “poisoned it from the beginning.”
 - n. Interview concluded at approximately 10:44 AM.

42. On May 19, 2010, at approximately 8:04 AM, I interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit D), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

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- a. [REDACTED] came to work for IDOC in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is responsible for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] supervises him.
- b. When [REDACTED] came to work for IDOC there were four or five contractors working in the IT area including Saravanaperumal and Patranabish. It was [REDACTED] understanding that the contractors were the architects and managers of the CIS program. [REDACTED] believed that the IDOC staff was only there to support the contractors and fill in when needed. [REDACTED] spent some time initially learning JAVA and learning what the contractors had done.
- c. [REDACTED] believed that CIS works well and that [REDACTED] understood what Patranabish was trying to create. [REDACTED] characterized Patranabish as a "hard worker" and "definitely a capitalist." [REDACTED] said that there was a problem with the flow of the project process, which delayed the progress of CIS. [REDACTED] stated that the original business requirements provided by then-[REDACTED] [REDACTED] were not really what IDOC was doing [REDACTED] described some of [REDACTED] frustration around working on parts of the program, introducing it to the users and being told that it was not relevant to the business practices. [REDACTED] said that they did not really do the proper groundwork in the beginning for planning CIS.
- d. [REDACTED] did not expect to receive any formal training from IDOC and was never told that [REDACTED] would. [REDACTED] did not recall being told about the training provided by the contractors. [REDACTED] was not aware of any long-range plans for maintenance of CIS once the contractors completed their work.
- e. [REDACTED] never observed the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] just does his job and does not feel any responsibility to monitor the contractors' activities. [REDACTED] also said [REDACTED]
- f. [REDACTED] observed some friction between the IDOC staff and the contractors primarily over decisions concerning the direction of CIS. [REDACTED] said, "Arup (Patranabish) was the one in charge and [REDACTED] made decisions they didn't like." [REDACTED] thought that people should "just get over it" and to do what they were told. [REDACTED] could not remember anything specific because [REDACTED] described himself as a person that just tries to ignore things. [REDACTED] did not recall any physical threats made between the contractors and the IDOC staff.
- g. [REDACTED] observed the contractors leaving the building with laptop computers, but assumed that they were their personal computers because of the way they behaved with them. [REDACTED] said that most people in that profession would have their own laptops.
- h. [REDACTED] was not aware of the contractors' work schedule, and did not really notice when they were in the building. [REDACTED] noticed that the contractors were conducting meetings in the second floor conference room with someone from ASI named "David."
- i. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of how CIS was funded other than the fact that some grant monies were used.
- j. When asked how things have changed since the contractors left, [REDACTED] said that there have been positive and negative outcomes. [REDACTED] said it has been good not to have to depend on the contractors. [REDACTED] explained that some of the coding work was given to

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- various staff and it was difficult to grasp the entire set of related issues without seeing the whole thing together. ■ stated that the contractors' departure has been bad because Patranabish and Saravanaperumal had a lot of historical knowledge of how CIS worked.
- k. ■ did not notice any change in the pace of the contractors' work over time.
- l. ■ recalled being told not to talk directly to the two subject matter experts (■ and ■) some time when ■ was still the project manager. ■ said that ■ might have been the reason this mandate was issued. ■ explained that ■ went directly to ■ regarding a question ■ had about community corrections. The following morning there was a meeting in IT in which they were told by ■ to "never again" talk to anyone but the quality assurance people. ■ never really understood why this happened.
- m. When asked what ■ thought of ■ as a manager, ■ said that ■ did things differently than ■ did when ■ (■ was a ■). ■ rarely had direct contact with ■ but found ■ to be untrustworthy. ■ said that the IT area has been more affected by the difference between the management styles of ■ and ■. ■ believed that ■ was just using the job as a "stop over" on ■ way to doing something else, but that ■ had more of a commitment to the project. ■ stated that there was a problem with the writing of his employee evaluation that ■ started and ■ finished. ■ did not think the information was accurate and ■ went to HR with his concerns. ■ was not completely satisfied with the outcome of the grievance process, but decided it was not "a hill to die on."
- n. ■ had very limited contact with ■. ■ stated, "it's not my job to watch ■."
- o. ■ confirmed that ■ had been picking up some of the work that the contractors had not completed. When asked what ■ thought of their technical expertise, ■ said that ■ had seen a lot of "cut and paste." ■ said that some of what ■ has seen is not up to the standards that ■ would have expected based on his past experience with coding for Saravanaperumal. When asked how much documentation was available for the coding done by the contractors, ■ said that there was not any.
- p. When asked why ■ thought CIS had been repeatedly delayed, ■ said that there are many things that get put on hold because other things need to occur first. ■ provided an example regarding the inmate banking piece of CIS. ■ said that inmate banking is not complete because they are still waiting for the business requirements to be finished, but the business requirements are not finished because no decision has yet been made if other software is going to be purchased for inmate banking. ■ cited resistance to change within the organization as another reason for the delays. ■ also mentioned the power struggle between the divisions stating, "whoever's got the most influence at the time, gets what they want."
- q. ■ believed that ■ got along well with everyone in the IT area, but described an "us against them" mentality between the two divisions of IT. ■ stated that there is a lot of pressure on staff to perform regarding the CIS implementation.

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given to ASI contractor Patrick Schwarz because [redacted] believed that this undermined [redacted] ability to do [redacted] job. [redacted] said that ultimately [redacted] ended up talking to [redacted] about his concerns, [redacted] did not feel anything was ever resolved. [redacted] did not believe that [redacted] ever afforded him the technical respect that [redacted] felt [redacted] had earned.

- e. [redacted] was never promised any additional training regarding CIS because of the type of job duties [redacted] has, but [redacted] believed that the IDOC programming staff was supposed to receive training from ASI. [redacted] was not aware of any long-term plan for maintenance of CIS once the contractors were done at IDOC.
- f. When asked if [redacted] thought the CIS implementation date of September 2009 was realistic, [redacted] said that [redacted] did not think it was, based on the contractors' past performance. The delay in implementation was further complicated by the change in managers when [redacted] left and [redacted] took over. [redacted] said that the contractors started with the easy pieces of CIS first, and this made the difficult part of the program harder to work on. [redacted] compared this to building a house and painting the walls before the foundation was ready.
- g. [redacted] never personally observed any of the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. When asked if [redacted] noticed any change in the pace of the contractors' work over the past year, [redacted] said that [redacted] was aware that "nothing was happening." [redacted] believed that the contractors supplied by ASI were essentially students rather than senior developers. [redacted] stated that all of their communication seemed to be routed through Saravanaperumal. [redacted] did not believe that the contractors were moving forward with CIS because they were not asking for anticipated changes to the database.
- h. [redacted] said that it was "pretty common" for the contractors to leave the building with laptop computers. [redacted] did not know whom these computers belonged to.
- i. [redacted] said that it was common knowledge that [redacted] had "cleaned out" the IT department, and [redacted] did not feel comfortable reporting issues to [redacted]. [redacted] had very limited contact with [redacted] but believed that [redacted] and [redacted] were very closely aligned as far as their "stern" approach to IT staff. [redacted] said that [redacted] mandated that IDOC IT programmers should not talk to staff outside their area to ask specific questions about the business requirements. [redacted] said that things have improved since [redacted] left IDOC and that people are starting to communicate more.
- j. When asked how things have changed since the contractors were removed, [redacted] said that it has been challenging, but much better. [redacted] said that when you "beat people down and treat them as second class people, then you take that away, eventually they're going to start blossoming." [redacted] said that the contractors had lied about what they had accomplished and IDOC staff have been trying to clean up after them. [redacted] said the lack of proper documentation has been a problem in trying to analyze what the contractors were doing. [redacted] referred to this lack of documentation as "highly unusual in an IT shop." When requested, [redacted] agreed to provide me with examples of deficiencies in coding that was reported to have been completed by the contractors.
- k. [redacted] was very critical overall of the management of the IT department. When asked for specifics, [redacted] stated that the most senior person in the area has only been with IDOC for three years, and that people are leaving, but the right questions are not being asked. [redacted]

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- f. When asked if [REDACTED] ever reported his concerns regarding the contractors to anyone, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] discussed them with [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not have any real proof. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] attempted to discuss the issue a few times with [REDACTED] but each time [REDACTED] did “it would turn into a different conversation” about something else. [REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED] defending the contractors, but stated that [REDACTED] appeared to be uncomfortable with the subject.
- g. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had lied to him “quite a few times.” [REDACTED] described taking a personal issue involving [REDACTED] and himself to [REDACTED] and being told that it would be taken care of. [REDACTED] said that several weeks went by and nothing had been done about it. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] took their concerns to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that after they went to [REDACTED] “all of a sudden [REDACTED] took action.” [REDACTED] described several other instances of taking concerns to [REDACTED] and stated that there seemed to be a “pattern” of [REDACTED] not taking action after promising to.
- h. [REDACTED] has never spoken directly with [REDACTED].
- i. [REDACTED] did not recall ever witnessing any negative interaction or threats between IDOC staff and the contractors.
- j. [REDACTED] noticed some of the contractors leaving the building with laptops, specifically Saravanaperumal and Schwarz. [REDACTED] believed this was IDOC owned equipment. [REDACTED] did not think this was odd because [REDACTED] knew that Schwarz worked off site frequently. [REDACTED] stated that it seemed odd to him that Saravanaperumal had two laptops at his desk. [REDACTED] believed that Saravanaperumal would sign into the instant messaging system on both laptops and set one of the laptops to indicate that [REDACTED] was present in the office whether he was there or not. [REDACTED] thought this was suspicious behavior.
- k. [REDACTED] observed that the contractors were frequently absent from the building. [REDACTED] also found [REDACTED] contact with Schwarz to be unpredictable and sporadic. [REDACTED] stated that if they were supposed to be working on the IDOC project forty hours a week then they should have been available.
- l. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] and Patranabish had a personal relationship because of the friendly demeanor between them.
- m. [REDACTED] stated that the lack of documentation provided by the contractors was very “unusual” within the industry.
- n. [REDACTED] estimated that during the past one and one-half years, the CIS project process flow has been changed five to seven times. [REDACTED] said that this has caused some of the delay in the implementation of CIS and attributed this to changes in the project manager position.
- o. [REDACTED] recalled asking about the possibility of receiving additional training during his pre-employment interview, but did not feel [REDACTED] got a definitive answer. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any long-range plan for supporting CIS once the contractors were done at IDOC.
- p. When asked how things changed after the contractors left, [REDACTED] said that the staff morale has improved and that they have come together as a team.
- q. [REDACTED] believed that the contractors were “churning” the SourceForge entries to make it look as if they were working on IDOC code issues. [REDACTED] estimated they were doing this about ninety percent of the time. [REDACTED] also believed that the contractors would intentionally

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“break” areas of the code so that they could not move forward for the purposes of keeping the work under their control. [REDACTED] had one specific example of this regarding a piece of code that had suddenly stopped working and when [REDACTED] and Systems Integration Specialist [REDACTED] looked at the code, it appeared to have been intentionally manipulated. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had saved all the SourceForge “tickets” since the beginning of his employment, which provided proof of what the contractors were doing.

- r. When requested, [REDACTED] agreed to provide me with examples of the contractors’ improper activities if [REDACTED] located any information during his work.
- s. Interview concluded at approximately 12:05 PM.

46. On May 19, 2010, at approximately 12:59 PM, I interviewed IDOC IT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (IDOC staff [REDACTED] in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit C), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

- a. [REDACTED] has worked for IDOC since [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is his immediate supervisor. [REDACTED] office.
- b. [REDACTED] duties include [REDACTED] [REDACTED] mainly interacted with Saravanaperumal. Because [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. At times, projects that the contractors had worked on were passed to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] found the coding work “not up to the standards I’m used to.” When asked for a specific example, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was assigned to test the offender identification badges and had been told the code was complete. It would not work properly and when [REDACTED] looked at it, [REDACTED] found the code to be “disorganized.” [REDACTED] stated that it appeared to be “copy and paste” and that sections of it did not belong. When [REDACTED] began to compare the coding to some other examples, [REDACTED] was able to identify where the copied code had originated.
- c. [REDACTED] never observed the contractors working on anything that appeared to be non-IDOC related. [REDACTED] recalled two occasions when [REDACTED] went looking for Saravanaperumal and could not locate him. [REDACTED] did not form any opinion about Saravanaperumal’s absence.
- d. [REDACTED] did not witness any negative interaction or threats between the contractors and IDOC staff. [REDACTED] did hear some complaints regarding contractor Patrick Schwarz being permitted to work from home.
- e. [REDACTED] had limited interaction with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not recall anything about additional training. [REDACTED] was not aware of any longevity plan associated with the maintenance of CIS. [REDACTED] believed that the contractors were scheduled to continue working at IDOC for approximately two years. [REDACTED] said that it was “kind of a joke” about the contractors being permanent.

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- f. When asked how things have changed since the contractors were removed, [REDACTED] said that it appeared to be good for their team and created more cohesiveness. It had previously seemed to him that the contractors were in charge and directing the IT activities. [REDACTED] said that a couple of the employees have “stepped up” and that [REDACTED] thought it was good.
- g. Interview concluded at approximately 1:20 PM.

47. On May 19, 2010, at approximately 2:03 PM, I interviewed [REDACTED] in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit D), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

- a. [REDACTED] has been employed by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is his immediate supervisor.
- b. [REDACTED] work area is on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] identified Saravanaperumal as the contractor [REDACTED] had the most contact with. [REDACTED] never observed the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was “completely” shocked when [REDACTED] learned why the contractors were removed from the building.
- c. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] filed a complaint with IDOC HR against Patranabish. [REDACTED] stated that Patranabish was “overseeing one of their projects” sometime after [REDACTED] left; and that [REDACTED] had given Patranabish too much authority. [REDACTED] said that Patranabish told [REDACTED] and other department employees that they had to “get this done in this amount of time or there’s gonna be firings.” [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] trusted Patranabish too much.
- d. [REDACTED] did not notice what specific hours the contractors were in the building, but thought that they sometimes came in late or left early. [REDACTED] was aware of the contractors frequently using their cell phones in the stairwell near his desk.
- e. [REDACTED] remembered seeing the contractors taking their laptop computers home. [REDACTED] assumed they had some kind of agreement with IDOC that allowed them to do this.
- f. [REDACTED] believed that some of the IDOC staff resented the contractors. [REDACTED] said that the contractors were given more interesting or important tasks that the IDOC staff were capable of performing. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] went to the contractors for direction on CIS and [REDACTED] did not think this was appropriate.
- g. [REDACTED] is currently working on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] described their work as a lot of “copy and paste” and said that they did not keep any documentation and that there has been a time investment in figuring out what they were doing. [REDACTED] said that at least [REDACTED] said that some of the work done by the contractors was good, especially in the architecture of the system.

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- h. ■ did not have frequent contact with ■. When asked to describe ■ as a manager, ■ said that ■ was “out of touch” and did not understand what was going on.
- i. ■ knew that CIS 2.0 was funded by a federal grant, but did not know anything else about the funding.
- j. When asked how things have changed since the contractors were removed from the building, ■ said that the IT team is a lot closer and is working directly together. ■ believed this has been a positive change. ■ did not think that the progress of the work on CIS has slowed, but believed it might even have accelerated.
- k. When asked if ■ had been told that ■ would be provided with additional training, ■ said that it was mentioned to him that there would be some training made available. ■ has not received any additional training other than a class in Jasper. When asked if ■ had ever spent any time cross training with the contractors, ■ said that ■ had been told about this, but it never occurred. ■ said that early during his employment, Patranabish went over some of the architecture with ■ and one other staff member during a three-week period. ■ was not aware of any maintenance plan for CIS once the contractors were done.
- l. When asked if ■ thought the level of complexity of CIS was beyond common understanding, ■ said that it was not. ■ said that it is sometimes difficult to “debug” a problem, but that most things can be solved by analyzing the code that is running in the background of the program.
- m. Interview concluded at approximately 2:43 PM.

48. On May 19, 2010, at approximately 3:16 PM, I interviewed ■ (IDOC staff # ■ in the OPS interview room at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit C), ■ provided the following relevant information:

- a. ■ began working for IDOC in ■. ■ is primarily responsible for ■ to. ■ is supervised by ■ cubicle is ■
- b. ■ had periodic interaction with the contractors over specific programming issues. ■ did not find them to be particularly responsive to questions or concerns.
- c. ■ never observed the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. ■ did not have a sense that they were attempting to hide their work from him when ■ entered their cubicles, but stated that ■ probably would not have recognized outside work because ■ was so new to IDOC.
- d. ■ did not notice very much about the work hours kept by the contractors. ■ did not notice whether the contractors were carrying computer equipment from the building.
- e. When asked ■ opinion of the technical expertise of the contractors, ■ said, “I have never ever on any project I’ve ever worked on anywhere ... seen anything as badly

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consideration for the reader because there were literally millions of “hits.” More specific information and actual printouts of the examination results are contained in the OPS files (see Attachments #12 and #15 for listing).

- a. Hard drive #1 (state tag number 364786) – Identified as the laptop checked out to contractor Patrick Schwarz – Contained files and documents for Super Value, Alaska, New Mexico, Missouri, Texas, TransUnion, IDOC Modularization and Platt Thompson’s employment agreement with ASI. There were many examples of ACOMS files and documents, forms and reports including an ACOMS Deployment Document dated 8/26/2009 authored by Ramesh Krishnan. Also found on this hard drive were the instructions for building and deploying WAR files at Alaska Linux Server dated 8/27/2009.
- b. Hard drive #4 (state tag number 364616) – Identified as the laptop checked out to contractor Suchetha Alety – Contained the ACOMS Booking Help Guide, Alaska report formats and the “Use Case Narrative” document for GE Healthcare.
- c. Hard drive #5 (state tag #361894) – Identified as the desktop checked out to contractor Chowdhry Saravanaperumal – Contained working files for Kansas, Missouri and Alaska, ACOMS report formats and the resumes of Saravanaperumal, Schwarz and Krishnan.
- d. Hard drive #6 (state tag number 364615) – Identified as the laptop checked out to contractor Prasanth Vijayan – Contained a large number of ACOMS report formats, an ASI bill to the State of Missouri dated 12/24/2008 for \$24,332.81, and the Alaska OMP Reference Guide.
- e. Search term: ACOMS – Yielded a number of documents related to ACOMS, the WinPho Replacement Project proposal (ID card program in Alaska), and a number of e-mails related to the ACOMS project. There are several e-mails from and to David McCauley of ASI on or about 2/8/2010, which indicate an attempt to justify some of the contractors’ activities through the misstatement of information regarding the “leveraging” of code.
- f. Search term: Arup – Yielded e-mails regarding the ACOMS project and other ASI business matters.
- g. Search term: CRI – Yielded a five-page independent contractor agreement between CRI and ASI.
- h. Search term: Cyndi – Yielded e-mails and information related to the use of Mantis to track the ACOMS “bug” fixes.
- i. Search type: Excel Files – Yielded many timesheet files, which were captured in a separate search (see item p below). Also included was an “ACOMS Phase 1” project plan that lists ASI contractor names and work assignments, and an ACOMS “bug” list.
- j. Search type: GroupWise Chats – Yielded many candid conversations between the contractors. Discussions included information regarding the demands placed on them by ASI management, work on non-IDOC projects, knowledge of double-billing, methods of subverting IDOC security and conspiring to lie about each others’ whereabouts to IDOC managers.

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- k. Search term: Mantis – Yielded evidence of use of the Mantis software, however, this information is somewhat garbled due to the way the programming language was stored on the computers.
- l. Search term: Patranabish – Yielded e-mails from May of 2007 regarding the creation of the ASI web site, references to the Alaska project, and deadlines and requests of the contractors.
- m. Search type: Spreadsheets – Yielded lists of ACOMS work requirements.
- n. Search term: Stegall – Yielded e-mails regarding ACOMS bugs, deadlines for builds, and ACOMS deadlines reminders. Many of these e-mails were sent and answered between 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM on weekdays, between Stegall and Saravanaperumal.
- o. Search term: Texas – Yielded an Architectural Specifications and Design document dated 12/2/2009 for the CIS Customization and Modularization project in Texas. This is a twenty-two-page document produced on ASI stationery. There was also a Texas “zip” file located, which could not be viewed.
- p. Search term: Timesheets – Yielded 133 time sheets for the ASI contractors indicating dates and hours worked on IDOC projects. No time sheets were found for any non-IDOC projects.
- q. Search type: Zip file – Yielded a zip file entitled “IDOC-CIS2.0” which could not be viewed.

50. On June 9, 2010, at approximately 9:00 AM, I interviewed CRI Chief Operating Officer Ken Malach in a first floor conference room at Central Office, 1299 North Orchard, Boise, Idaho. Also present at that meeting were [REDACTED], Deputy Attorney General Paul Panther and CRI’s legal counsel Jason Melville of McAnaney & Associates, PLLC. During the unrecorded interview, Malach provided the following relevant information:

- a. CRI’s association with ASI began sometime in January or February of 2007. Malach could not remember whether Arup Patranabish or [REDACTED] initiated this association. He referred to CRI’s contract with IDOC as “staff augmentation” rather than a contract for specific deliverables. He described CRI’s function in the contract as “passing paper through” and stated that CRI received twenty percent of the fees billed to the customer (IDOC).
- b. CRI’s knowledge of which individuals were working at IDOC was limited to their names appearing on timesheets submitted by Patranabish, and verification that each worker had proper visas and work permits. CRI relied on Patranabish to select the appropriate people for work at IDOC. He recalled [REDACTED] and Patranabish approaching CRI with a request to hire additional people. Malach described the IDOC timesheets as listing the name of the worker and the dates worked, and said that Patranabish signed off on each of the timesheets. He stated that CRI had a few billing issues regarding some of the timesheets, but described these as clerical errors that were corrected either by CRI or IDOC. He did not believe any of the errors were intentional attempts to receive overpayments. When

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overtime work occurred, it was his understanding that Patranabish received prior approval from IDOC.

- c. When asked about CRI then-employee Platt Thompson's role in the IDOC contract, Malach said that Thompson came to IDOC to "network" and provide general customer development. When asked who took Thompson's place upon his departure from CRI, Malach said that "it had fallen through the cracks," and that nobody from CRI had been coming to IDOC regularly. Malach has attended three to four meetings with IDOC since 2007.
- d. Malach knew that Thompson had gone to work at ASI, but was not aware that he was a principal in that company.
- e. Patranabish approached CRI sometime in 2008 with a potential contract opportunity in Alaska. CRI ultimately contracted with the State of Alaska under a reciprocal agreement through the State of Idaho. Malach recalled that Mark Little (of the Idaho Division of Purchasing) was present at the CRI offices to assist with this agreement. He described the contract with Alaska as based on deliverables with a specific cost and timeline for each portion of the project. He recalled that the bills submitted to CRI by ASI for the work done in Alaska did not contain specific names of individuals, but listed the progress of the project as justification for payment. CRI does not currently have any contracts with the State of Alaska.
- f. When asked if he knew whom the [REDACTED] was, Malach stated "that's a really good question." He said that he knew [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had been project managers, but was unaware of whom the current manager might be. He named [REDACTED] as the individual managing the contracts.
- g. Malach denied taking an active part in managing the IDOC contract or in monitoring the behavior of the subcontractor. He stated that CRI relied on IDOC to manage the work and deliverables.
- h. Malach denied any knowledge of duplicate billing on ASI's part or that ASI contractors were working on other accounts while on IDOC property during regular work hours. He stated that any work performed for customers other than IDOC should have been performed at that customer's place of business or at the ASI offices.
- i. CRI is not currently using Patranabish for any of their projects in Idaho or in any other state. Malach was not aware that ASI was an approved vendor in the State of Alaska, and did not know that ASI is currently working at Idaho Health & Welfare.
- j. Malach expressed concern over the length of the investigation and its potential affect on CRI's standing as an approved vendor for the State of Idaho.
- k. Interview concluded at approximately 9:40 AM.

51. On June 23, 2010, at approximately 1:00 PM, I interviewed ASI Vice President, Operations David McCauley in a first floor conference room at the Correctional Industries office, 1301 North Orchard, Boise, Idaho. Also present at that meeting were Deputy Attorney General Paul Panther and ASI's legal counsel, Scott Randolph of Holland & Hart, LLP. During the unrecorded interview, McCauley provided the following relevant information:

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- a. McCauley began working for ASI sometime in September 2009. He identified himself as the human resource and general service contact for ASI. He stated that he provides oversight on some projects, but has no specialized computer skills. He directly supervises Cindy Stegall, an ASI senior solutions analyst and Patrick Schwarz, a technical lead.
- b. He was/is responsible for projects contracted with Alaska DOC, Alaska State Police, Alaska Health & Welfare and Idaho Health & Welfare.
- c. He had very limited contact with CRI Advantage.
- d. He denied any friendships or associations with any IDOC staff. He identified [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (former IDOC employee) as individuals he knew through previous work for other employers.
- e. His contact with the ASI developers was limited until sometime in January or February 2010 when Arup Patranabish instructed him to start spending time at the IDOC office. He estimated that he came to the IDOC about twice a week and spent time with the contractors in the IT area. During this time he became acquainted with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
- f. McCauley said that he became familiar with NCOMS after coming to work for ASI. He believed that NCOMS owned the software used by both Alaska and Idaho.
- g. When asked about the contractors' use of IDOC equipment, McCauley stated that he knew nothing about the equipment and believed that Schwarz was in charge of that. When specifically asked if he knew who owned the equipment, McCauley stated all of the following: (1) He did not know then, but now knows that the equipment was owned by IDOC; (2) he had assumed that ASI owned the equipment; (3) he never really thought about it; (4) he rarely saw the contractors, but if he did, their laptops would have been in bags; and (5) he thought it must be okay or they would not be doing it.
- h. When asked if he believed the contractors had permission to work on other projects while on IDOC time, McCauley stated that he assumed the contractors were only working on IDOC issues while at IDOC. He recalled that Patranabish and Platt Thompson told him that the contractors were to concentrate on IDOC issues while at IDOC. He then stated that they were working on other projects after-hours to just "run down a few bugs."
- i. He was not aware that Stegall was contacting the contractors frequently throughout the workday and believed that most of the communications occurred after-hours.
- j. He identified Chowdhry Saravanaperumal as the on-site tech manager during the IDOC project.
- k. When asked what the "Ramesh Project" was, McCauley said that Ramesh (Krishnan) was working on the code modularization project. When asked why Don Brand of Alaska DOC identified Krishnan as their main programmer, McCauley stated that Brand must have been confused because Krishnan sat in on a few conference calls with Alaska. He stated that "everybody" worked on the Alaska project after-hours.
- l. In reference to the IDOC meeting held on 1/6/2010, McCauley said that it was his understanding that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] met with Patranabish and Thompson to express

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their concern over the contractors working on ACOMS during IDOC business hours. McCauley denied any prior knowledge of the contractors working on ACOMS while at IDOC. He stated that the 1/6/2010 meeting was the underlying reason he began to come to the IDOC office. He said that after this meeting, the contractors were told not to work on ACOMS while at IDOC.

- m. McCauley stated that ASI did not exercise enough control over the contractors and that they have taken measures to correct this. When asked what kind of action was taken, he said that ASI purchased "Team Forge" software, which would permit them to track the activities of contractors.
- n. Interview concluded at approximately 1:40 PM.

52. On June 23, 2010, at approximately 1:50 PM, I interviewed ASI Chief Operating Officer, Harry Platt Thompson in a first floor conference room at the Correctional Industries office, 1301 North Orchard, Boise, Idaho. Also present at that meeting were Deputy Attorney General Paul Panther and ASI's legal counsel, Scott Randolph of Holland & Hart, LLP. During the unrecorded interview, Thompson provided the following relevant information:

- a. Thompson began working for ASI sometime in February of 2009. His primary duties revolve around business development and finding new projects. He denied any technical computer capabilities. He directly supervises Vice President of Sales Joie Mason.
- b. Thompson was previously employed by CRI, but decided to go to work for ASI because he "had hit the ceiling" and "he loves to grow small companies." He only recalled coming to the IDOC office once "years ago" on behalf of CRI.
- c. When asked if he recalled how the business relationship between IDOC, CRI and ASI began. He could not remember who initially approached CRI about the IDOC project, but thought it might have been Arup Patranabish.
- d. Thompson denied any personal relationships with IDOC employees. He met with [REDACTED] only two or three times in [REDACTED] office. He also recalled meeting with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on two or three occasions. He is acquainted with [REDACTED] because of [REDACTED] position as [REDACTED] and believed they had a good working relationship.
- e. When asked about his level of contact with the contractors, Thompson explained that in February of 2009, Patranabish went to India for about three weeks. During that time, Thompson came to the IDOC building daily to "check in" with the contractors. Otherwise, he had very little contact with any of the developers or programmers.
- f. When asked if he was aware of the funding streams used for the CIS project, Thompson stated that he just knew there was "a bucket of money...maybe a million" and he thought it came from federal grants.
- g. He denied any knowledge that ASI contractors were working on other project while at IDOC. Thompson was aware that there were "big deliverables" for Alaska that were due in December 2009, but believed this work was done after 5:00 PM at the ASI office.

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- h. When asked about the meeting held on 1/6/2010, Thompson said that prior to this meeting, he was unaware that Alaska work was being done at IDOC. He believed that the contractors had been told not to “reinvent the wheel,” which meant that they should look at solutions in Alaska that might be applicable to Idaho. He believed that the contractors were instructed to obtain permission from ██████████ to engage in this kind of activity prior to doing it. He said that following the meeting, ASI “put procedures in place” to provide better oversight of their people. These procedures included meetings with the contractors to emphasize the rules in the employee manual, and the use of a software program called “Team Forge” or “SourceForge” to monitor the contractors’ activities.
- i. He did not know that the equipment used by the contractors belonged to IDOC until sometime in February 2010. Previous to that date, he believed the equipment belonged to ASI. He said that the contractors should not have used IDOC equipment and stated, “goodness gracious, we can afford a few laptops.”
- j. When asked if he was aware of the activities of David McCauley or Cindy Stegall, Thompson replied that Patranabish was “in charge.” He explained that once a contract has been signed, his (Thompson’s) involvement is minimal because his focus is on new project development.
- k. Thompson identified the following ASI projects: Alaska Dept. of Revenue, Alaska DOC, Alaska Health & Welfare, Alaska Dept. of Public Safety, and Idaho Health & Welfare. He stated that they are also awaiting word on projects in Texas and Oregon. He identified Patranabish as being in charge of NCOMS projects for ASI.
- l. When asked why his employment agreement with ASI was on one of the IDOC hard drives, Thompson appeared upset and stated that he had no idea how that could happen. He said several times that this information was upsetting to him and he asked if the agreement could be removed. He stated that the only place the agreement should be was on his or Patranabish’s computers.
- m. Thompson offered the opinion that ASI might have made an error in the way the projects were presented to the contractors. He stated that there were cultural issues with the contractors’ inability to say “no” to someone in authority, and that ASI should have been more aware of this when creating “pressure to perform.” He apologized several times throughout the interview about ASI’s failure to better monitor the activities of their contracted staff.
- n. Interview concluded at approximately 2:40 PM.

53. On June 23, 2010, at approximately 2:45 PM, I interviewed ASI Chief Executive Officer and President Arup Patranabish in a first floor conference room at the Correctional Industries office, 1301 North Orchard, Boise, Idaho. Also present at that meeting were Deputy Attorney General Paul Panther and ASI’s legal counsel, Scott Randolph of Holland & Hart, LLP. During the unrecorded interview, Patranabish provided the following relevant information:

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- a. When asked how he first began working for IDOC, Patranabish stated that he had known [REDACTED] when they both worked [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] had called him about doing some work on an IDOC project. He recalled that IBM had been contracted to perform work, but “had almost walked out on the contract.” He met with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and agreed to work on the IDOC project. He believed this was in 2006. After he saw the scope of the IDOC project, Patranabish informed [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that “it was a big one” and that it would require more people to work on it. They told him that he could go to any of five approved state vendors and work something out. He went to CRI and they agreed to use him as a subcontractor for twenty percent of the billing.
- b. Patranabish denied knowing [REDACTED] prior to the meeting with [REDACTED]. He stated that he was not a personal friend of [REDACTED], but that they played golf about once a month and that they met in bars about twice a month to discuss business over drinks. He said that other IT employees also met them for drinks and identified [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as being present at various times.
- c. He denied being personal friends with [REDACTED] and stated that he did not know [REDACTED] until he began contract work at IDOC.
- d. He is currently in touch with [REDACTED]. He stated that [REDACTED] “knows about this” and though [REDACTED] has asked him about it, he has not told [REDACTED] anything.
- e. Patranabish recalled that when he first worked for IDOC, he reported to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. At sometime he told [REDACTED] that they needed more people. When IDOC received money under the PREA grant, it allowed him to hire four more contractors.
- f. When asked about CRI’s involvement at IDOC, Patranabish said that he did not communicate regularly with them. Ken Malach at CRI told him that he did not care about managing the employees at IDOC as long as CRI was getting paid.
- g. When asked about his role in NCOMS, he explained that he attended some of the meetings and provided some presentations to the NCOMS group at [REDACTED] request.
- h. When asked about the contractors’ use of IDOC equipment, Patranabish stated that there was a “wrong understanding” regarding this. He stated that when he came to IDOC, he was allowed to take his laptop home and therefore, he did not think there was anything wrong with the contractors taking their laptops home. He said that it was a “wrong assumption” to think that the computers could be used for work other than for IDOC. He knew the contractors were taking their computers home, but did not know if [REDACTED] knew about it.
- i. When asked who the lead technical person was at the IDOC site, Patranabish refused to name any individual, but stated that at one time he thought it was Patrick Schwarz although Schwarz was frequently not working onsite. He denied that Chowdhry Saravanaperumal was the team leader. He said that he made a “big mistake” in not assigning this responsibility to someone. When he ceased to work in the IDOC building, he told [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] but did not take any action to fill the role he had played. He stated that one of the reasons he wanted to remove himself from the IDOC billing was to save the state money, which would help extend the contract. He recalled meeting with

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- ██████████ to find out the amount of grant funds remaining so that he could better plan for his departure from IDOC.
- j. Patranabish said that prior to the meeting at IDOC on 1/6/2010, he was not aware that ASI contractors were working on Alaska code while at IDOC. He recalled that he had told the contractors sometime prior to 1/6/2010 not to work on other projects while at IDOC, but referred to his “personal failure” in not following through with them. He said that when ██████████ first asked him about the contractors working on ACOMS while at IDOC, he did not believe it was possible because of the firewall. ██████████ showed him a “video” of one of the contractors logging onto the ACOMS system and he concluded that Saravanaperumal must have figured out a way to do this without his knowledge. He did not believe that anyone at IDOC had given the contractors permission to work on any outside projects.
 - k. He said that he did not monitor the day-to-day activities of David McCauley or Cindy Stegall, but that he knew from a “high level” what McCauley was doing. He stated that McCauley worked for Thompson, but that he was aware that McCauley was coming over to IDOC to meet with ██████████. He recalled telling Stegall not to call or e-mail the contractors at IDOC anymore after the 1/6/2010 meeting. He knew that Stegall often stayed late at the ASI office to work on the Alaska project “because of the time difference” and that the contractors would come from IDOC to ASI to work on Alaska after 5:00 PM. He speculated that McCauley might have put too much pressure on Saravanaperumal regarding the Alaska project. He also stated that perhaps there was too much pressure to “go live” with CIS.
 - l. When asked to explain what the “Ramesh Project” was, Patranabish stated that it referred to the code modularization project and that Ramesh (Krishnan) was the only one working on that for IDOC. When specifically asked about an e-mail referring to Krishnan’s availability now that ACOMS was winding down, Patranabish emphatically stated that that was wrong. He said that Krishnan “sat in” in some conference calls with Alaska and that that was his only involvement with them. When asked why Don Brand from Alaska identified Krishnan as the main programmer on the ACOMS project, Patranabish said that Brand was mistaken.
 - m. Patranabish stated that he did not know how much time the contractors spent on ACOMS while at IDOC, but estimated that it might be about one month and that was how he arrived at the \$100,000 amount of possible compensation that was presented to ██████████. He said that ASI would really like to finish the CIS project and that he believed it would take them about three weeks to do so.
 - n. During the interview, Patranabish used the phrase “fall on my sword” several times in reference to his admissions that ASI was at fault in not monitoring their contractors more closely. He made the statement that the company grew too fast and there were not enough controls in place. Patranabish made several statements indicating his desire to repair his relationship with IDOC and his concern over damage to ASI’s reputation.
 - o. Interview concluded at approximately 3:50 PM

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said that CRI was initially contracted to provide two programmers in ongoing positions. When asked if these were the “staff augmentation” positions mentioned to me by ██████████ ██████████ said that ██████████ had never heard that term used before. ██████████ stated that the two positions were meant to “supplement” the staff working on CIS, but that they were not considered staff because they were contractors. ██████████ recalled having only one previous meeting with Malach and Thompson to discuss billing issues and “over-billing” sometime in 2007.

- f. When asked why IDOC was paying the contractors based on hours and not on deliverables, ██████████ explained that because two of the contractors were working directly with IDOC staff on ongoing CIS programming, it was very difficult to identify specific deliverables. ██████████ also stated that because the two original contractors (Patranabish and Saravanaperumal) were “an integral part” of our staff and supposed to be training the IDOC staff on CIS, it was difficult to determine how their time was spent. ██████████ said that ██████████ had originally prepared an appropriation for new IDOC staff positions, but was asked to shift the resource request to private contractors. ██████████ said that when the additional contractors were added with the federal funding for the modularization project, they were originally on a deliverables-based billing; but that it was changed to hourly when they started working on CIS. I explained to ██████████ that ██████████ was unable to adequately describe this process to me during ██████████ interview, and ██████████ stated that all ██████████ information on this topic came directly from ██████████ ██████████ said that ██████████ was solely responsible for the federal “appropriation” and that ██████████ told ██████████ that the contractors were supposed to get all the modularization done for \$1.2 million dollars regardless of how many hours they worked. When asked if ██████████ would be surprised to learn that all the bills presented to IDOC were hours based, ██████████ said yes. ██████████ stated that for example, if IDOC had paid them \$500,000 then they should have had at least five modules completed. ██████████ believed that four modules were actually completed.
- g. ██████████ said that ██████████ requested a change to the scope of the NCOMS grant because the programmers could not modularize anything more until the “core” project was completed. ██████████ filed a request with the federal grantor’s representative, Kathy Mason, and received permission to shift the contractors to CIS. When asked if NCOMS was asked for permission to do this, ██████████ said that ██████████ believed that ██████████ had to “report out” on it during the monthly NCOMS meetings. When asked again if NCOMS had granted their permission for the shifting of resources, ██████████ said, “I don’t believe so because it was still part of the modularization.” ██████████ believed that ██████████ told NCOMS after the fact. I suggested that ██████████ look into this because I had received information that indicated that NCOMS did not know. ██████████ stated that NCOMS has not been told about the investigation or the reason for ██████████ departure.
- h. When asked if ██████████ believed that ASI contractors provided training to IDOC staff, ██████████ said that they did. ██████████ stated that the contractors were working “hand-in-hand” with IDOC staff to train them on JAVA programming. ██████████ said that Saravanaperumal took on the role as lead trainer and that the training was on going.

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- with this case, ██████ said that it was a factor. ██████ cited ██████ inability to take proper action. ██████ said that ██████ even took some previously approved time off when ██████ should have been dealing with the contractor issues.
- o. When asked if ██████ believed that ██████ had an outside relationship with Patranabish, ██████ said "a little bit." ██████ stated that ██████ had cautioned ██████ on it and that ██████ sometimes became too friendly with vendors. In his 2009 employee evaluation, ██████ told ██████ to cease outside contact with all vendors.
- p. ██████ recalled that ██████ was not aware of problems with the contractors until sometime in December of 2009 when ██████ reported it to ██████. ██████ told ██████ that two of ██████ staff had reported concerns about the contractors and that ██████ and ██████ ██████ had decided to install Spector Pro on their computers. ██████ told ██████ this was fine, and reported it to ██████ later that same day. At some time in early February 2010 ██████ showed ██████ the results captured by Spector Pro. ██████ asked IT ██████ to also review some of the screen shots to determine if ██████ came to the same conclusions as ██████. ██████ agreed with ██████ assessment and the decision was made to remove the contractors from the building. ██████ said that the information in the screen shots made ██████ angry and that ██████ was shocked by how prevalent the abuses were. In reference to the placating e-mails that ██████ received from Patranabish, ██████ said that ██████ thought they indicated guilt. (See Attachment #15 for e-mail listings.)
- q. In reference to the 1/6/2010 meeting, ██████ was not aware of any follow-up action taken other than the installation and review of the Spector Pro screen shots.
- r. ██████ related some information about NCOMS such as asking ██████ ██████ because ██████ needed to focus on CIS, the group's interest in becoming a non-profit and a meeting that occurred in New Mexico. ██████ said that ASI was trying to position itself to be the exclusive contractor for NCOMS states and Idaho and Utah protested this. When asked about Patranabish's e-mail of 8/12/2009, in which he stated that he had lost his way, ██████ said it was in reference to the attempt to encourage NCOMS to become a non-profit and to use them exclusively.
- s. ██████ said that ██████ relied on information from Patranabish and on the work in progress report to track the progress of CIS, but ██████ could not describe any actual controls or verifications used to determine if the contractors were producing specific work or if the reports were accurate.
- t. When asked if ██████ ever met Patranabish off-site, ██████ said that ██████ "never did." When presented with an e-mail dated 1/4/2010 which indicated that ██████ met Patranabish for coffee, ██████ said, "Oh, oh, this one. Yeah, ██████ knew about this." ██████ said it was the only time ██████ ever met Patranabish away from IDOC. ██████ stated that he wanted to know what was going on with the meeting scheduled for 1/6/2010, but ██████ did not give him any information. ██████ stated that ██████ informed ██████ of this meeting via e-mail. When asked how ██████ handled Patranabish's requests for off-site meetings, ██████ said that ██████ told Patranabish it was not appropriate. They belong to the same gym and ██████ has occasionally seen him when ██████ goes there. ██████ denied any in-depth conversations at

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the gym and told him [REDACTED] could not talk to him there. When provided with Patranabish's e-mail requesting that [REDACTED] meet with him after-hours outside his office, [REDACTED] denied ever meeting with him. (See Attachment #15 for e-mail listing.)

- u. When asked what [REDACTED] thought of Patranabish's promise of delivery of CIS by April 2010, [REDACTED] said it made [REDACTED] believe that ASI had been "leading us on."
- v. In reference to the [REDACTED] complaint regarding Patranabish's racist behavior, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was disgruntled over the firing of his friend, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had been counseled on his behavior previously and when he made a threat of physical harm towards Patranabish; he was dismissed for it. [REDACTED] and HR Specialist [REDACTED] conducted some interviews and determined that [REDACTED] complaints were unfounded, but [REDACTED] did talk to Patranabish about making references to himself as "the brown man."
- w. When asked if [REDACTED] recalled an incident in which Patranabish and Saravanaperumal were caught going through former staff member Cindy Stegall's desk, [REDACTED] did not remember this issue. When asked if [REDACTED] knew of other incidents of friction between IDOC and the contractors, [REDACTED] said that there were things associated with CIS that IDOC was not able to complete. [REDACTED] said that in one instance an IDOC staff member had been unable to satisfactorily complete a task for about eight months. [REDACTED] came to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and asked for permission to give the task to the contractors. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] mishandled the reassignment of this task and left staff with the impression that the contractors were better than the IDOC staff. [REDACTED] counseled him on this, telling [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] should not treat staff this way. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] was selective about what [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was not aware of any other issues. [REDACTED] said it was difficult to determine why the development of CIS was so slow, and stated that the business requirements kept changing. [REDACTED] described a process to track requests for changes to CIS that was put in place since the contractors were removed. [REDACTED] stated that this process was meant to prevent the "scope creep" that was occurring within CIS and provide the accountability piece that was previously missing.
- x. When asked if [REDACTED] had formed any opinion about the progress of CIS based on the apparent fraudulent actions of the contractors, [REDACTED] said it was really hard to tell what was going on since the business requirements kept changing. [REDACTED] said that in hindsight [REDACTED] wished they had put some accountability measures in place a lot sooner.
- y. [REDACTED] denied any previous knowledge of the contractors working on non-IDOC projects. [REDACTED] stated that the contractors should have only been working on IDOC projects while in the building.
- z. Interview concluded at approximately 2:45 PM.

56. On August 13, 2010, at approximately 9:19 AM, I interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in his office at 1299 North Orchard, Suite 201, Boise, Idaho. During a recorded interview (on Exhibit E), [REDACTED] provided the following relevant information:

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- a. [REDACTED] came to IDOC in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] had heard of CIS prior to coming to work at IDOC, but had no direct knowledge of it.
- b. [REDACTED] recalled the 2007 OPS report (#07-032) and stated that [REDACTED] had recently reviewed the findings and recommendations. [REDACTED] did not remember sharing the content of the report or the recommendations with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was trying to assess everyone's competencies. [REDACTED] had been told that there was "a lot of turmoil" in IT and [REDACTED] tried to determine the source of it. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] management style is to "watch and listen," and that is what [REDACTED] did for approximately the first six months. [REDACTED] said that in hindsight [REDACTED] probably should have reacted more to the OPS report, but [REDACTED] did not believe [REDACTED] had enough information at the time. [REDACTED] recalled discussing the time and billing issues with IT Manager [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] assured [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was "on top of it" and that it was being taken care of. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not know enough about the situation in IT to make judgements about it; and that, "in the end, [REDACTED] was the expert in that area."
- c. [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] has oversight of the IT area along with fiscal and capital improvements, and that [REDACTED] reported directly to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] described the steps he and [REDACTED] took in holding [REDACTED] accountable for his management of the IT area. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] amassed a considerable amount of documentation regarding [REDACTED] shortcomings and that they were following the process prescribed by IDOC for progressive discipline. [REDACTED] denied any involvement with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] blamed [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] performance issues, and [REDACTED] was not aware of Health & Welfare checking with anyone at IDOC about employing [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] listed several positive things that [REDACTED] had done for IDOC including the development of NCOMS and stated that people forget the good things that [REDACTED] accomplished.
- d. [REDACTED] first became aware of the issues regarding the contractors in December of 2009. [REDACTED] reported [REDACTED] concerns directly to him. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] first question to [REDACTED] was "why are you here, why are you talking to me" because it was [REDACTED] responsibility to manage the IT area. [REDACTED] told him that [REDACTED] came to him because [REDACTED] did not believe that [REDACTED] would do anything about [REDACTED] concerns or the contractors' behavior. [REDACTED] identified [REDACTED] report as the catalyst for the installation of the Spector Pro software on the contractors' computers. [REDACTED] had a meeting with [REDACTED] and they determined to use this event as a "test" to see if [REDACTED] was going to respond appropriately. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] incompetence became more apparent once Patranabish stopped working in the IDOC building. [REDACTED] thought that [REDACTED] had been relying on Patranabish to manage the IDOC project, and once [REDACTED] left,

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- █████ was unable to do it on █████ own. █████ believed that █████ was even less likely to bring problems and issues to █████ once █████ started holding him accountable for █████ poor management decisions.
- e. █████ had also been concerned about ASI's Platt Thompson's behavior at some of the NCOMS meetings █████ attended. █████ felt that Thompson was approaching NCOMS members inappropriately and campaigning for the formation of a non-profit group, all for the purpose of furthering ASI's business. █████ did not relate these business activities to the production level of the contractors until after █████ had the discussion with █████
- f. █████ said that █████ had other meetings with IT staff regarding █████ management style, but this did not seem to be about the contractors. █████ stated that when █████ went back and read through some of the information, █████ realized there were complaints about the contractors' activities.
- g. █████ had no specific knowledge of █████ having a personal relationship with Patranabish. █████ was concerned that █████ was too friendly with vendors, not just Arup Patranabish. █████ stated that █████ seemed to like the "perks" that █████ perceived came with █████ position. █████ counseled █████ on this behavior and gave several examples of his intervention with █████. █████ did not believe that █████ was a dishonest person, but that █████ was "not competent" in certain areas.
- h. When █████ personally observed the contractors, they always appeared to be at their desks working diligently. █████ stated that there was no easy way to tell exactly what they were working on. █████ told him repeatedly that they were making progress with CIS, and █████ had no way to gauge the truthfulness of these statements.
- i. When asked about the 8/13/2009 e-mail referring to Patranabish "losing his way," █████ said that this was about the aggressive business model that ASI was following. █████ tied this to Platt Thompson's behavior in attempting to build ASI's customer base. █████ mentioned that Thompson and Patranabish had presented the IDOC's CIS system to Correctional Corporation of America in Nashville. This made █████ uncomfortable because ASI had not asked for permission to do this. (See Attachment #15 for e-mail listing.)
- j. When asked if █████ was aware of █████ meeting Patranabish off-site, █████ said that █████ did not believe █████ ever had. █████ did not recall █████ reporting this to █████ but said that █████ has always been very good at keeping him informed. █████ said that Patranabish seemed to believe that █████ could talk directly to █████ about issues with █████ (See Attachment #15 for e-mail listing.)
- k. When asked what his understanding was of how we initially got the two original contractors (Patranabish and Saravanaperumal), █████ said that when Director Reinke first came to IDOC, they identified the need for additional IT staff. This was formally requested, but the Governor's office denied the request and asked IDOC to use contractors instead of creating new staff positions. █████ said that there were "dedicated" dollars in the IDOC budget to pay for the two contractors on-going. Things got confused when the grant funds for the modularization project allowed for the hiring of additional

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- contractors. [REDACTED] stated that it was [REDACTED] responsibility to manage this. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] numerous times for an accounting of this, but did not receive anything.
- l. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] wished [REDACTED] had acted more quickly and that [REDACTED] takes ownership of what happened.
 - m. Interview concluded at approximately 10:37 AM.

57. On August 18, 2010, I completed this report and it was prepared for dissemination to [REDACTED] and Deputy Attorney General Panther.

GLOSSARY:

- ACOMS – Alaska Corrections Offender Management System
- CIS – Idaho’s Correctional Integrated System
- Informix (aka “database”) – An IBM software product for managing data
- Mantis – Web-based bug tracking software used by ASI to track work on ACOMS
- Modularization (aka “CIS 2.0”)
- NCOMS (aka the “consortium” and “CIS 2.0” and “modularization”) – National Consortium of Offender Management Systems
- PREA – Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (federal law)
- Requirements – the end users’ needs identified for the purpose of programming to those needs
- Resources – the ASI contractors
- SourceForge – Web-based source code repository providing a centralized location for software developers to control and manager software development. Used by IDOC to track CIS.
- Spector Pro – “spy ware” software providing screens shots, keystrokes, Internet usage history and other information
- Utah system – Original source code for CIS

EVIDENCE DATA:

- Exhibit A: One (1) DVD-R containing folders/files copied from IDOC internal network shared drive. There are four (4) folders identified as “prasanth,” “senthil,” “suchetha,” and “Vijay.”
- Exhibit B: One (1) CD-R containing the search results from the computer forensic examination performed by the IWRCFL.
- Exhibit C: One (1) CD-R containing recordings of interviews associated with the investigation. Interviews are in wav.file format. There are eight (8) interviews: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
- Exhibit D: One (1) CD-R containing recordings of interviews associated with the investigation. Interviews are in the wav.file format. There are eight (8) interviews: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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Exhibit E: One (1) CD-R containing recordings of interviews associated with the investigation. Interviews are in wav.file format. There are two (2) interviews:

 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Exhibit F: One (1) DVD-R containing a digital audio/visual recording of an interview with

 [REDACTED]

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Memo from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] dated 2/18/2010 (nineteen pages).
2. Memo from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] dated 2/17/2010 (three pages).
3. Administrative Allegation/Complaint Form signed by Director Reinke on 2/25/2010.
4. E-mail to [REDACTED] dated 3/3/2009 authored by [REDACTED]
5. Statement to [REDACTED] dated 10/22/2009 authored by [REDACTED]
6. E-mail to Patranabish dated 10/26/2009 authored by [REDACTED]
7. E-mail to Patranabish dated 12/11/2009 authored by [REDACTED]
8. E-mail to [REDACTED] dated 12/27/2009 authored by [REDACTED]
9. A two-page document dated 2/16/2010 entitled "Regroup with Contractors Meeting."
10. A three-page unsigned, undated document purportedly authored by [REDACTED]
11. Statement re delivery of thumb drive dated 3/2/2010 authored by [REDACTED]
12. OPS spreadsheet entitled Timeline – Computer Activity (from e-mails, screen shots, FBI search, etc.)
13. IWRCFL Service Request form dated 3/10/2010 submitted by Brisbin.
14. A two-page list of computer equipment signed and dated 3/29/2010 by Patranabish and Brisbin.
15. OPS spreadsheet entitled Timeline – Events and Communications (from e-mails, documents, etc.)
16. One-page letter to [REDACTED] dated 4/7/2010 authored by Rissell.
17. Memo to Brisbin dated 4/23/10 authored by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
18. E-mail to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (two pages) dated 2/16/2010 authored by Patranabish.
19. E-mail to Brisbin dated 5/4/2010 authored by [REDACTED]
20. Undated list of bug fixes provided to [REDACTED] by McCauley.
21. Document entitled "Excerpt From ProbationTerminationAction.java" dated 5/19/2010 authored by [REDACTED]
22. Report of Examination from IWRCFL dated 5/26/2010.
23. E-mail to Brisbin dated 6/3/2010 authored by [REDACTED]
24. Three-page Executive Summary Memorandum dated 10/12/2007 authored by Loucks.

NAME OF INVESTIGATOR (PRINTED)	INVESTIGATOR'S SIGNATURE	DATE
Lorie Brisbin		8/18/2010