This article in today’s Los Angeles Times caught our eye not so much for the headline, Two charged in illegal San Diego campaign contribution scheme, but for these two paragraphs  buried deep in the article:

“According to the complaint, Encinas then approached a would-be candidate’s representative with an offer: masked contributions from the Mexican businessman, in exchange for the candidate, if elected, firing Police Chief Bill Lansdowne and letting Encinas pick his successor.

‘Encinas further stated that this was the one ‘guarantee’ he sought from Candidate 4 in exchange for the Foreign National’s campaign money,’ according to the complaint.“

The news article explains that “Encinas” is retired San Diego police detective Ernesto Encinas.  Here is a link to the complaint against Ravneet Singh.  Here is the news release distributed by the US Attorney for the Southern District of California.

Now why would “the Mexican businessman” be willing to funnel illegal campaign contributions through Encinas to San Diego mayoral “Candidate 4” in return for that candidate agreeing if elected to fire San Diego Police Chief Lansdowne and letting Encinas pick the new police chief?  What could “the Mexican businessman” possibly gain from having control over the choice of San Diego, California’s new police chief?

OpenCdA doesn’t think it will require too many brain cells to figure that one out.

The lesson to be learned, however, is that there can be the equivalent of “the Mexican businessman” in many communities throughout the United States.  Controlling law enforcement executives, prosecutors, judges, and other elected officials may provide a useful and unique type of business insurance not necessarily offered by traditional companies.  Just as elections have consequences, so do the appointments made by those elected officials.